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REGULATION OF FRACKING IS NOT A TAKING OF  
PRIVATE PROPERTY 
Kevin J. Lynch∗ 
Abstract 
The oil and gas industry should lose most, if not 
all, takings claims they might bring as a result of 
regulation on fracking, even regulation that bans 
fracking in specific communities or even statewide.  
Many in government and in the oil and gas industry 
think otherwise, and therefore when industry 
threatens takings claims, the assumption is they 
will win.  These threats act to scare off government 
officials from enacting protections demanded by 
their constituents.  This Article lays out the many 
difficulties faced by those who would bring 
fracking-takings claims in an attempt to show that 
governments should not be deterred from enacting 
regulations to protect against the worst harms of 
fracking. 
As the use of fracking has spread during the recent 
oil and gas boom, inevitable conflicts have arisen 
between industry and its neighbors, particularly as 
fracking has moved into densely populated urban 
and suburban areas.  Concerned over the impacts 
of fracking—such as risks to health and safety, 
diminished property values, air and water 
pollution, as well as noise, traffic, and other 
annoyances—many people have demanded a 
government response.   
Government regulation of fracking has struggled to 
catch up to the changes in industry, although, in 
recent years, many state and local governments 
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have taken steps to reduce the impacts of fracking 
in their communities or to ban the practice 
outright.  This article focuses on government 
restrictions in New York and Colorado, two of the 
key battlegrounds in the fight over fracking.  New 
York recently prohibited fracking across the entire 
state after several towns had enacted their own 
bans.  In Colorado, the people have used the ballot 
initiative process to enact restrictions on fracking 
directly in a handful of local communities, and a 
few statewide measures are expected to be on the 
ballot this Fall. 
The industry has responded, not only with public 
relations spending to improve fracking’s damaged 
reputation, but also with legal challenges to these 
efforts to rein in oil and gas development.  In 
addition to suing local governments, often arguing 
they do not have authority to regulate fracking, the 
industry threatens to bring costly takings claims for 
compensation due to alleged economic harms.   
This Article examines the numerous legal and 
factual issues that should make it difficult for the 
industry to succeed on fracking-takings claims.  
First, regulation of fracking, even including 
outright bans, almost always can be defended as 
necessary to prevent a nuisance or other 
background principle of law that justifies 
government regulation.  Second, even if a nuisance 
defense could be overcome, industry would have 
difficulty proving that regulation has destroyed all 
economic value in their property, and are thus 
unlikely to be able to take advantage of the 
categorical takings rule.  When fracking-takings 
claims are considered under the default balancing 
test, takings are unlikely to be found except in rare 
outlier cases.  Finally, because requiring 
governments to pay compensation in fracking-
takings cases would risk creating a windfall for 
industry at the expense of the public, particularly if 
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the oil and gas eventually is extracted, courts 
should resist the temptation to rule against 
government restrictions to protect public health, 
safety, and the environment.  Fracking-takings 
claims should therefore only succeed in rare 
circumstances where the regulation of fracking is 
patently unreasonable or unnecessary, and 
therefore government officials and policymakers 
should not be dissuaded from regulating fracking 
based on threats of takings liability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The oil and gas industry has been booming across the United States 
for several years now, primarily due to widespread use of high volume 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking).  Modern fracking depends on new 
directional and horizontal drilling techniques to produce oil and gas 
reserves that previously were unrecoverable.  The industry aggressively 
has been exploiting this newfound oil and gas supply, leading to record 
profits.  However, a growing body of public health literature supports 
what many communities in oil country already know: modern fracking 
techniques create serious impacts to public health, public safety, and the 
environment, particularly when industry seeks to extract oil and gas 
from densely populated urban and suburban areas. 
In response to the encroachment of fracking operations—which 
places large-scale industrial operations in the middle of residential, 
commercial, or other sensitive areas—many local communities have 
decided to protect their quality of life, as well as their health, safety, and 
property rights, from the impacts of fracking.  The range of available 
government responses to fracking includes zoning restrictions to 
preserve the character and safety of residential neighborhoods, 
regulations to prevent some of the worst impacts of fracking, outright 
bans on fracking at the state and local level, or a time-out (moratorium) 
to allow time for further study or to develop an appropriate regulatory 
response. 
The oil and gas industry has gone all out to defeat or limit any 
restrictions on the extraction of oil and gas through fracking.  Almost 
any local restriction immediately is challenged as preempted by state 
law, with mixed success.  Industry also threatens, before restrictions are 
enacted, to file takings claims that will bring dire consequences 
following any government regulation that reduces the economic value of 
oil and gas interests.  These threats undoubtedly have discouraged some 
communities from enacting restrictions that otherwise would have been 
adopted. 
However, takings claims based on government restrictions on 
fracking, referred to here as “fracking-takings,” are not a straightforward 
matter.  Despite a popular misconception, the Takings Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution does not require compensation for any government 
action that reduces the value of private property.  Rather, takings 
jurisprudence recognizes that government has an important role to play 
in balancing the interests of private property against the interests of the 
public as a whole.  Because fracking is just one completion method that 
can be used to produce oil and gas, and particularly because modern 
fracking techniques create great risks to the health, safety, and 
environment of neighboring communities, fracking-takings are not 
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likely to succeed.  Furthermore, any fracking-takings cases which 
require payment of just compensation would risk creating a windfall 
profit for the oil and gas industry or inappropriately limiting necessary 
government regulation. 
This Article examines many difficulties facing fracking-takings 
claimants.  Although takings law is notoriously confusing and 
indeterminate, fracking-takings claims are not likely to prevail.  Rather, 
only in rare and limited circumstances should fracking-takings claims 
succeed.  Part II of this Article lays out the recent developments in 
technology and economic conditions that have led to the fracking boom, 
the growing understanding of the impacts that fracking has on 
surrounding communities, and the regulatory response taken by state 
and local governments in New York and Colorado.  Part III examines 
the law of regulatory takings in general as well as the limited takings 
cases in the oil and gas industry, including state-specific takings cases 
that bear on the key issues likely to arise in fracking-takings cases.  Part 
IV then explains, for each stage of the takings analysis, why mineral 
owners or oil and gas companies will have a difficult time prevailing on 
a fracking-takings claim.  Ultimately, despite the unpredictable nature of 
takings claims in new substantive areas, fracking-takings cases appear 
unlikely to succeed, and many policy reasons suggest caution is 
warranted to avoid creating windfall profits for the oil and gas industry. 
II. REGULATION OF FRACKING 
A. Background on Fracking 
Much of the oil and gas being produced today in the United States 
using fracking could not have been produced even a decade ago.1  The 
combination of horizontal and directional drilling technology, the use of 
enormous volumes of water for hydraulic fracturing, and the high price 
for oil and natural gas2 has made it economical to produce oil and gas 
from tight formations such as shale.  This tremendous reserve of oil and 
gas was known previously but assumed to have little to no value because 
there was no way to extract it at a reasonable cost that would allow for a 
profit.  That changed in recent years and led to incredible growth in the 
 1. Patrick C. McGinley, Regulatory Takings in the Shale Gas Patch, 19 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 193, 193-94 (2011) (discussing the development of technology that has enabled production of 
natural gas reserves in shale which was previously uneconomic to produce). 
 2. Fracking in the United States is very expensive and it relies on high prices for oil and gas for 
the investment to make business sense.  If oil prices are above $100/barrel, then the industry can make a 
large profit even off of very expensive wells.  However, at lower prices such as exist currently, the 
ability to profitably produce oil and gas through fracking is called into question.  See discussion infra 
Part IV.D. 
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oil and gas industry in many parts of the U.S., including New York and 
Colorado.3   
Fracking is one completion technique, a single part of the process of 
developing a well, and yet it is the key technology that has created such 
conflict when it comes into new communities.  Completion is the 
process that occurs after a well bore has been drilled, but before the well 
begins producing oil and gas.4  The well typically would produce oil and 
gas regardless, even without fracking, but fracking normally is done to 
increase the amount of oil and gas produced, which helps to offset the 
tremendous cost of drilling long horizontal wells and the cost of the 
fracking process.  Fracking involves pumping large volumes of water, 
along with sand and chemicals—often hazardous ones5—down a well 
bore, under pressure, with the intent of widening underground fissures to 
allow more oil and gas to escape from the rock formation.6  Fracking is 
but one completion process; other processes commonly were used 
historically,7 and new processes are being developed that might obviate 
the need to frack at all.8 
However, the boom of the oil and gas industry does not come without 
costs.  Initial fears about the impacts of fracking were focused on water 
quality issues, both because the process of fracking is very disruptive to 
 3. See, e.g., Daniel J. Graeber, Low oil prices may hurt Colorado economy, UPI (Mar. 19, 2015, 
6:32 AM), http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2015/03/19/Low-oil-prices-may-hurt-
Colorado-economy/2631426758579/. 
 4. Well completion has been defined as “the activities and methods of preparing a well for the 
production of oil and gas or for other purposes, such as injection; the method by which one or more flow 
paths for hydrocarbons are established between the reservoir and the surface.”  U. OF TEX. CONTINUING 
EDUC., PETROLEUM EXTENSION SERV., A DICTIONARY FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 229 (1st ed. 
2005). 
 5. See Theo Colborn et al., Natural Gas Operations from a Public Health Perspective, THE 
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTION EXCHANGE, 
http://www.endocrinedisruption.org/assets/media/documents/GasManuscriptPreprintforweb12-5-11.pdf 
(last visited May 18, 2016). 
 6. Hydraulic fracturing is defined as “an operation in which a specially blended liquid is 
pumped down a well and into formation under pressure high enough to cause the formation to crack 
open, forming passages through which oil can flow into the wellbore.  Sand grains, aluminum pellets, 
glass beads, or similar materials are carried in suspension into the fractures.  When the pressure is 
released at the surface, the fractures partially close on the proppants, leaving channels for oil to flow 
through to the well.”  PETROLEUM EXTENSION SERV., supra note 4, at 127.  Historically, oil and gas 
development used vertical wells and limited, if any, fracking, thus the impacts at the surface and to 
neighboring communities was dramatically less in the past. 
 7. Dep. of Stuart Ellsworth at 32:1-24, May 8, 2014, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of 
Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Colo.) (discussing how wells in Colorado were producing 
since the 1860s, long before fracking was developed). 
 8. For example, a process called “underbalanced drilling” allows for production to occur based 
on the pressure in the reservoir, rather than relying on fracking, in order to economically produce oil and 
gas without many of the negative impacts associated with fracking.  See, e.g., WEATHERFORD INT’L, 
UNDERBALANCED DRILLING, http://www.weatherford.com/products-services/well-construction/secure-
drilling/underbalanced-drilling (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
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the rock formations where the oil and gas are found, and also because 
fracking fluid contains many dangerous and toxic chemicals.9  If those 
chemicals reach drinking water supplies, it can be impossible to remove 
the contamination.  In some places tap water could even be lit on fire 
due to natural gas that had migrated into the water supply.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) currently is working on a 
study of the potential threats to drinking water from fracking and has 
released a draft of that report.10  In addition to water, other concerns 
about fracking quickly became apparent, such as concerns over air 
pollution caused by fracking and associated activities.11  Additionally, 
fracking has been linked to serious adverse health consequences,12 as 
well as to reductions in neighboring property values.13 
Fracking operations are essentially large scale industrial operations 
with all the concomitant noise, light, traffic, air pollution, and impacts to 
water and wildlife habitat that any large industrial operation would have.  
The difference with fracking is that the operations go where the oil and 
gas are found, which often is right beneath neighborhoods, schools, and 
parks.  Rather than people coming to the nuisance, this is a case where 
the nuisance comes to the people.  This situation has created inevitable 
conflicts as the annoyance14 of having fracking operations next door is 
 9. See Colborn et al., supra note 5. (“Some of these chemicals include benzene, a known 
carcinogen, and methylene chloride which is highly toxic to humans.”) 
 10. EPA, ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL AND 
GAS ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES, EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT (June 2015).  Despite much 
publicity of the statement that EPA “did not find evidence that [fracking] mechanisms have led to 
widespread, systematic impacts on drinking water resources in the United States,” the report did still 
recognize the threats that fracking poses to drinking water such a using up scarce water supplies, spills 
of fracking fluids or produced water, fracking directly into underground water resources, migration of 
fluids and gases underground, and inadequate wastewater management.  Id. at ES-6.  EPA confirmed a 
number of instances where fracking had impacted drinking water supplies during both routine activities 
as well as accidents.  Id. at ES-23. 
 11. See, e.g., Rachael Rawlins, Planning for Fracking on the Barnett Shale: Urban Air 
Pollution, Improving Health Based Regulation, and the Role of Local Governments, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
307 (2013).    
 12. See, e.g., Colborn et al., supra note 5 (discussing known health effects of chemicals used in 
natural gas production); Lisa M. McKenzie et al., Human Health Risk Assessment of Air Emissions from 
Development of Unconventional Natural Gas Resources, 424 SCI. TOTAL ENVIRON. 79, 82-83 (2012) 
(finding residents living with a half mile of wells to be at greater risk of cancer and other health effects).  
For a more comprehensive listing of peer-reviewed papers on the topic, see THE ENDOCRINE 
DISRUPTION EXCHANGE, Chemicals in Natural Gas Operations: Peer-Reviewed Papers, 
http://endocrinedisruption.org/chemicals-in-natural-gas-operations/peer-reviewed-articles (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2015). 
 13. Ron Throupe et al., A Review of Hydro “Fracking” and Its Potential Effects on Real Estate, 
21 J. OF REAL ESTATE LIT. 205, 227 (2013) (finding an expected decrease of 5-15% on home values in 
robust real estate markets, and up to 25% decrease in weaker markets). 
 14. Annoyance may be too mild a term, as neighbors to fracking operations often report 
unbearable noise, light, or vibration as well as toxic fumes which cause headaches, nosebleeds, and 
more serious health impacts. 
 
2016] FRACKING/TAKINGS 45 
combined with our growing but still incomplete knowledge of the public 
health impacts associated with fracking operations.  As a result, many 
people who have fracking disrupting their lives have demanded that 
their governments—both state and local—do something to protect them 
from this harm.  Where governments refuse or are too slow to respond, 
citizens take matters into their own hands through their ability to enact 
regulations or prohibitions at the ballot box. 
In response, industry15 has raised several challenges against these 
restrictions on what they see as their absolute right to extract oil and gas, 
regardless of the consequences.  As an initial matter, once it recognized 
the public relations issue on its hands, industry began spending a small 
portion of its newfound wealth to try to assure the public that fracking 
was safe and there was no reason to be concerned.  Then, when local 
governments enacted regulations, industry argued that local 
governments do not have authority to regulate the industry due to state 
preemption.  The ultimate argument presented by industry is that if 
government wants to regulate, or especially prohibit, fracking, then it 
will have to pay for “taking” its property.  In response to these 
arguments, governments typically have responded by under-regulating 
the industry in the eyes of their constituents.  Citizens have in some 
instances skirted their elected representatives by voting for additional 
regulation at the ballot box.16 
This last point is rather remarkable in light of the history and 
development of the oil and gas industry.  The mineral rights now 
asserted to be so valuable previously had little to no value.  Only the 
technological advances and high prices for oil and gas made these 
resources so desirable.  Thus, mineral interest owners who bring 
fracking-takings claims may experience a large windfall if they are able 
to extract these previously worthless resources.17  Yet they threaten 
 15. The term “industry” is used broadly in this Article to include oil and gas companies, mineral 
rights owners, industry associations or trade groups, and others who support, lobby, and generally argue 
against regulations or restrictions that may be placed on fracking.  
 16. Fort Collins, Colorado, provides a good example of this phenomenon.  Although the city 
council had initially put its own moratorium on fracking in place, it later exempted the only operator, 
Prospect Energy, from that moratorium.  When the citizens of Fort Collins proposed to reinstate the full 
moratorium at the ballot box, the city council adopted a resolution urging the defeat of the measure, in 
part due to concerns over the cost of litigation that the city would face from industry.  See Fort Collins 
City Council, Meeting Minutes, Oct. 1, 2013 at 314-18.   
 17. Of course, windfalls might occur in other contexts as well, and the presence of a windfall 
would not necessarily bar all takings claims.  However, the presence of a windfall should be relevant to 
a court that is determining whether the government is “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”  Armstrong v. U.S., 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  The problem is particularly pronounced in the fracking context due both to the large 
relative amount of the windfall/potential takings claim as well as the potential harm to the public in 
terms of serious health consequences and possibly even deaths.  A court that would impose a multi-
million dollar fracking-takings judgment against a local government would thereby be elevating 
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takings claims if they are denied the ability to capture this windfall.  
Such a windfall is harmful because it imposes potentially crippling costs 
on the public simply to reward a private property owner for having done 
nothing.18  Alternatively, the threat of takings liability (either before or 
after resolution by the courts) might lead governments simply not to 
regulate, thus allowing industry to impose negative externalities on the 
public in terms of pollution, noise, traffic, and general disturbance of the 
peace of formerly quiet residential neighborhoods.  Thus, regardless of 
the current state of takings law and how it might apply to fracking-
takings, it would be bad public policy if the courts were to hold that 
governments must reimburse mineral owners for this windfall in order to 
protect the public from the risks and harms of fracking. 
B. The Continuum of Fracking Regulation 
In response to the explosive growth of fracking and the encroachment 
of oil and gas operators on residential areas, many state and local 
governments, or their citizens, have shown interest in regulating or 
prohibiting fracking outright.  The first approach that can be taken is a 
moratorium—a time-out on development to allow the government to 
study the risks and benefits and develop an appropriate regulatory 
response.  The next step might be issuing zoning regulations that restrict 
the areas in which fracking can occur.  Local governments potentially 
could regulate the technical process of fracking, limiting the types and 
amounts of chemicals used or regulating the pressure used to force the 
water into the formation.  Oftentimes, however, this type of regulation 
will fall to the state level as local regulations may be preempted in some 
states.  Ultimately, some communities or even entire states may decide 
that the risks of fracking are too great, and it should be prohibited 
outright.  These options encompass the range of fracking regulation that 
currently exists today. 
windfall profits over protection of public health, particularly since many governments might respond by 
simply removing the regulation and allowing the harm to occur.  Such a result would not support notions 
of “fairness and justice” which underlie takings jurisprudence.  This is obviously a complicated topic 
which bears further research and study, but it should at least be noted at this time as a potential argument 
against a fracking-takings claim. 
 18. Perhaps a company which invested significant resources in developing fracking technology 
to exploit new oil and gas reserves might be able to claim they deserve the opportunity to profit from 
their investment and innovation.  However that is not the typical claimant in a hypothetical fracking-
takings case.  Those claimants instead likely have invested very little, if any, money or time in making 
their formerly valueless resource become profitable to extract. 
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1. New York Case Study 
New York perhaps has gone farther than any other state to protect its 
citizens and its environment from the unknown risks and the known 
impacts of fracking.  Initially, the state adopted a moratorium in order to 
conduct further study to see if fracking could be done safely.  Then-
Governor David Patterson put this moratorium in place in 2010 while 
directing that state agencies such as the Department of Environmental 
Conservation  
complete its review of the public comments, make such 
revisions to the Draft SGEIS that are necessary to 
analyze comprehensively the environmental impacts 
associated with high-volume hydraulic fracturing 
combined with horizontal drilling, ensure that such 
impacts are appropriately avoided or mitigated 
consistent with the State Environmental Quality Review 
Act (SEQRA), other provisions of the Environmental 
Conservation Law and other laws, and ensure that 
adequate regulatory measures are identified to protect 
public health and the environment.19   
Because of the complicated nature of this issue, it took four additional 
years to complete the state’s analysis.  In late 2014, the current 
Governor Andrew Cuomo made the moratorium into a permanent ban, 
relying on the advice from the Department of Environmental 
Conservation and the Department of Health. 
The review compiled by the New York Department of Health was 
quite thorough and broad, and it sets out ample reasons why the state 
should not rush ahead with allowing fracking when the impacts, both 
short and long term, are unknown.20  The study noted air impacts that 
could affect respiratory health, climate change impacts, drinking water 
impacts, soil and water contamination from spills, surface-water 
contamination from waste treatment, induced earthquakes, and 
 19. Exec. Order No. 41, issued Dec. 13, 2010 (Requiring Further Environmental Review of 
High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus Shale), 
https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Document/Ib2187f04646111e09f330000845b8d3e?viewType=FullText
&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default). 
 20. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, A PUBLIC HEALTH REVIEW OF HIGH VOLUME HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT (2014).  The study concluded that “the overall weight of 
the evidence from the cumulative body of information . . . demonstrates that there are significant 
uncertainties about the kinds of adverse health outcomes that may be associated with [fracking], the 
likelihood of the occurrence of adverse health outcomes, and the effectiveness of some mitigation 
measures in reducing or preventing environmental impacts which could adversely affect public health.  
Until the science proves provides sufficient information to determine the level of risk to public health 
from [fracking] to all New  Yorkers and whether the risks can be adequately managed, DOH 
recommends that [fracking] should not proceed” in New York.  Id. at 2. 
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community impacts associated with boom-town economics.21  While 
recognizing the importance of further study to reduce uncertainty, the 
study concluded that fracking has resulted in environmental impacts that 
threaten public health, justifying a ban on fracking statewide.22  As a 
result, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation has 
stated its intent to ban fracking in New York.23 
In addition to the statewide measure prohibiting fracking, many local 
jurisdictions in New York also have taken steps to prohibit fracking 
through their zoning authority.  Most notably, the Town of Dryden was 
one of the first local governments in New York to prohibit fracking.  In 
August 2011, the Town Board of Dryden voted to amend the local 
zoning ordinance expressly to prohibit extraction of oil and gas or other 
associated processes.24  The Town Board declared that natural gas 
exploration “poses a significant threat to [Dryden’s] residents’ health, 
safety, and general welfare.”25 
The local ban in Dryden was challenged by industry as being 
preempted by state law.  However, the courts in New York upheld the 
authority of towns such as Dryden to use their zoning authority to 
prohibit certain land uses, such as fracking, from their jurisdictions.  
Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held that state law did not 
prohibit local zoning laws which prohibit oil and gas development, 
based on the plain language, statutory scheme, and legislative history of 
the New York Oil, Gas, and Solution Mining Law.26  The ultimate 
resolution of the case was based on “the relationship between the State 
and its local government subdivisions.” 27  Although the state could have 
preempted local regulation of oil and gas operations, there was not 
sufficient evidence to show “a clear expression of preemptive intent.”28   
Thus, the current law in New York is that the state has prohibited 
fracking for an indefinite duration.  Even if this statewide ban eventually 
is modified or removed, local governments have the authority to prohibit 
 21. Id. at 4. 
 22. Id. at 11.   
 23. Press Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Cons., New York State Department of Health 
Completes Review of High-volume Hydraulic Fracturing (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/press/100055.html (stating that DEC Commissioner Joe Martens will implement 
the recommendation to ban fracking in New York). 
 24. TOWN OF DRYDEN, ZONING LAW, art. V, § 502 (2012).  See also Dryden Town Board, Res. 
No 126 (2011), Resolution in Support of Adopting Amendments to the Town of Dryden Zoning 
Ordinance Clarifying the Town’s Prohibition of Natural Gas Exploration and Extraction (Aug. 2, 2011), 
http://dryden.ny.us/Board_Meeting_Minutes/TB/2011/TB2011-08-02.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 10. 
 26. Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1201 (N.Y. 2014). 
 27. Id. at 1203. 
 28. Id. 
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fracking themselves, and several jurisdictions already have done so.29   
2. Colorado Case Study 
Colorado has experienced tremendous population growth since 
previous oil and gas booms.  Thus, a small portion of the oil and gas that 
now are recoverable through the use of fracking lie beneath land that is 
much more heavily populated than before.30  The conflicts in Colorado 
between industry and the public largely have occurred in suburban areas 
along the Front Range,31 where many people have moved for the quality 
of life to be found in quiet residential communities.  That quality of life 
increasingly has been threatened as the oil and gas industry has 
encroached upon those communities, proposing massive wellsites right 
in the middle of many residential neighborhoods as well as near parks 
and schools.32  This has led to demands that all levels of government 
take action to prevent harm and protect communities from fracking. 
Several state agencies have responsibility for regulating the oil and 
gas industry.  Historically, primary responsibility for regulation of the 
industry at the state level was in the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (COGCC), part of the Department of Natural Resources.  
The COGCC derives its authority from the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Act, which has been amended several times in recent years to require 
that oil and gas development be “consistent with protection of public 
health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and 
wildlife resources.”33  In spite of this statutory mandate to protect the 
public and the environment, the COGCC never has denied an 
application for a permit to drill based on environmental concerns.34  The 
COGCC also has not set any substantive limitations on when or how 
 29. The Story of Dryden:  The Town That Fought Fracking (And Is Winning), EARTHJUSTICE, 
www.earthjustice.org/features/the-story-of-dryden-the-town-that-fought-fracking-and-is-winning (last 
visited July 25, 2015) (noting that more than 100 towns in New York have enacted local bans or 
moratoria on gas drilling). 
 30. For example, Longmont only occupies 0.02% of the land area of Colorado but has a 
population density of 3,294 people per square mile.  Aff. of Mary Ellen Denomy ¶ 8, May 30, 2014, 
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Colo.). 
 31. The Front Range refers to the area where the majority of the population in Colorado lives, in 
the urban corridor abutting the Rocky Mountains.  See Understanding Colorado Regions, 9NEWS.COM, 
http://archive.9news.com/weather/resources/region_guide/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2015). 
 32. See, e.g., Sarah Jane Kyle, Proposed wells near school draw ire of Timnath residents, 
COLORADOAN (Dec. 10, 2014, 7:59 AM), http://www.coloradoan.com/story/news/2014/12/09/proposed-
wells-draw-fear-timnath-residents/20163783/. 
 33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I) (2014). 
 34. Dep. of Stuart Ellsworth at 146:25-148:4, May 8, 2014, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of 
Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Colo.) (head of engineering for state agency could not recall a 
permit to drill ever being denied). 
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industry may frack wells.35  Instead, the regulations only require limited 
notice to neighboring landowners and the state before fracking begins 
and disclosure of some of the chemicals that are used in the fracking 
process.36  In response to pressure from the public, the COGCC also has 
moderately increased setbacks for all wells whether the wells use 
fracking or other methods.37 
Unhappy with the severe impacts that fracking still can have on 
communities under state regulations, many citizens have pushed their 
local governments to take further steps to protect them.  In response to 
citizen pressure, the City of Longmont enacted a series of land use 
regulations applicable to oil and gas operators and secured the 
agreement of industry to comply with those.38  Unsatisfied that these 
regulations still would allow fracking to occur in their community, many 
residents of Longmont successfully organized a campaign to amend the 
city charter to prohibit fracking entirely.39  This ban on fracking was 
challenged in state court on preemption grounds.40   
 35. Some COGCC regulations do relate to technical matters such as well casing, but those apply 
to all wells broadly, and not wells that will be fracked, specifically.  See, e.g., COGCC Rule 207, 308B, 
317, 318A, 341, 523, 703, 802, 804.  The only regulations which apply specifically to fracking simply 
require completion of a chemical disclosure registry form (including exemptions for “trade secrets”) and 
a requirement for providing 48 hours of advance notice before fracking is conducted.  COGCC Rule 
205A, 316C.   
 36. See Colo. Oil & Gas Conserv. Comm’n, Rule 205A(b)(2) (requiring disclosure of chemicals 
after fracking occurs on a well); Rule 316C (requiring 48 hours advance notice be provided before 
fracking).  No other state regulations specifically apply to fracking operations although some general 
requirements would apply to fracking, such as Rule 805.c related to fugitive dust from oil and gas 
operations.  Rule 805.c. 
 37. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, Rule 604.a(1) (2014) (setting the default setback to 
be 500 feet from any “building unit”).  The previous setback was only 150 feet.  The regulations do 
allow for waivers of this minimum requirement, and the state has not even been enforcing the 
requirement.  SIERRA CLUB, REVIEW OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY AND THE COGCC’S COMPLIANCE 
WITH COLORADO’S SETBACK RULES 2 (2015), http://www.law.du.edu/documents/student-law-office-
clinical-programs/ELC-Form-2a-Executive-Summary.pdf (noting that 181 permit applications since 
August 1, 2013, out of a total of 1,300 application, lacked critical information necessary to ensure 
compliance with setbacks and other requirements). 
 38. CITY OF LONGMONT, Ordinance O-2012-25 (2012).  This ordinance amended the city code.  
See, e.g., LONGMONT MUNICIPAL CODE, §§ 15.04.020.B.32 (laying out zoning requirements for oil and 
gas operations and facilities under the Land Development Code).   Those regulations included greater 
setbacks than state law required (350 feet), a ban on oil and gas development in residentially zoned 
areas, and other requirements to minimize noise and visual impacts of fracking operations.  See id.  
Although the state and industry sued to block these regulations, arguing they were preempted by state 
law, both parties agreed to drop their suit and, therefore, the regulations in Longmont can be enforced to 
any future oil and gas development. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. City of Longmont, No 
2012CV702 (Boulder Cty. Colo.), dismissed by stipulation and without prejudice (Oct. 15, 2014). 
 39. Longmont City Charter, Article XVI (the “Longmont Public Health, Safety and Wellness 
Act” cites to the inalienable rights provision of the Colorado constitution as justification for a 
prohibition on hydraulic fracturing within the city). 
 40. See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, No. 2014CA1759 (Colo. Ct. App.).  
Briefing on this appeal was completed on April 2015.  In an unusual development, the Court of Appeals 
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Following the actions taken by Longmont and its citizens, other 
jurisdictions began to take action against fracking as well.  In November 
2013, citizens of Fort Collins, Broomfield, Boulder, and Lafayette all 
voted to place limitations on fracking.41  Some of these measures also 
have been challenged in court by the oil and gas industry, with the Fort 
Collins case challenging a five-year moratorium having proceeded all 
the way up to the Colorado Supreme Court.42 
As this Article was undergoing final edits, the Colorado Supreme 
Court decided both the Longmont and Fort Collins cases, striking down 
the fracking ban and moratorium that had been enacted locally in those 
communities, respectively, on preemption grounds.43  The Court did not 
close the door on all moratoria related to oil and gas, leaving open the 
possibility that a moratorium of shorter duration might not be 
preempted.44  And the Court rejected claims of implied preemption, 
meaning that some regulation on fracking might still be permissible 
even at the local level.45  The state might also decide to enact a ban, or 
to change the Oil and Gas Conservation Act to allow local bans, 
although this would require a significant change in politics.  
Additionally, Colorado voters are expected to consider statewide ballot 
asked the Colorado Supreme Court to take up this case, and the companion case out of Fort Collins, 
before the Court of Appeals ruled.  The Colorado Supreme Court agreed to hear the cases, and 
ultimately issued its decisions in May 2016.  For procedural background, see City of Longmont v. 
Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 577 (Colo. 2016).  See also City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil, 
369 P.3d 586, 590 (Colo. 2016). 
 41. Fort Collins and Broomfield voters both approved temporary moratoria on oil and gas 
development, and the City of Boulder extended its moratorium to allow time for further study of the 
impacts of fracking and for the local government to develop an appropriate response.  See Ballot Issue 
2A Election Results, DENVER POST, http://data.denverpost.com/election/results/ballot-issue/2013/fort-
collins_city__ballot-issue-2a/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2015); Broomfield Five Year Fracking Suspension, 
Question 300 (November 2013), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Broomfield_Five_Year_Fracking_Suspension,_Question_300_(November_2013) 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2015).  Lafayette voters approved a “Community Bill of Rights” provision to amend 
the city charter, which was designed to prohibit the extraction of oil and gas in the city and to affirm the 
rights of natural people over corporations.  City of Lafayette “Community Rights Act” Fracking Ban 
Amendment, Question 300 (November 2013), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/City_of_Lafayette_%22Community_Rights_Act%22_Fracking_Ban_Amendmen
t,_Question_300_(November_2013) (last visited Dec. 2, 2015); see also Community Rights, 
COMMUNITY ENVTL. LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.celdf.org/section.php?id=423 (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2015). 
 42. See City of Fort Collins v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, No. 2014CA1991 (Colo. Ct. App.).  
Briefing on this appeal was completed April, 2015.  Just as in the Longmont case, this case was 
transferred to the Colorado Supreme Court after briefing was completed.  City of Fort Collins v. Colo. 
Oil, 369 P.3d 586, 590 (Colo. 2016). 
 43. See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573 (Colo. 2016); City of Fort 
Collins v. Colo. Oil, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016).  
 44. City of Fort Collins, 369 P.3d at 594 (“We express no view as to the propriety of a 
moratorium of materially shorter duration.”). 
 45. City of Longmont, 369 P.3d at 583-84. 
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measures in November 2016, one that would restore local control over 
oil and gas operations and another that would increase minimum setback 
requirements,46 which could give rise to similar threats of takings 
liability.  Regardless, these preemption decisions from the Colorado 
Supreme Court will not end the debate over the necessity of further 
regulations on fracking at the state or local level.  As long as the 
industry seeks to drill and frack near homes, schools, parks, and other 
sensitive communities, members of the public will demand greater 
protections from local and state officials.  Therefore, the analysis in this 
Article should remain helpful for future decision-making, even if the 
specific Colorado laws which are analyzed have been found to be 
preempted by state law. 
III. TAKINGS LAW 
Takings jurisprudence in the United States is notoriously complex 
and inconsistent47 with the hallmark of the development of the law being 
dramatic swings by the Supreme Court from one end of the spectrum to 
the other.  As a result, the application of takings law to new situations is 
relatively difficult to predict.  Private interests can find helpful language 
in Supreme Court opinions which support their position that government 
regulation has gone too far and amounted to a de facto condemnation of 
their property.  Government and public interests can find equally helpful 
language in those same opinions to support their position that reasonable 
regulation, such as theirs, is well within the scope of their authority and 
no compensation is required. 
However, in some situations (such as the oil and gas context) the 
specter of astronomical takings judgments against states or local 
governments can be used by private interests to intimidate them, 
dissuading enactment of regulations demanded by the public.  However, 
despite the scare tactic of potential takings claims and the uncertainty as 
to how courts will apply takings law to new situations, a few general 
 46. CREED, Initiatives, http://resistextremeenergy.org/initiatives/ (last visited May 25, 2016); 
see also Joshua Zaffos, Colorado activists set their sights on ballot measure to limit drilling, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/issues/48.3/the-fractured-terrain-of-oil-and-gas-
opposition/colorado-activists-set-their-sights-on-a-ballot-measure-to-limit-drilling. 
 47. The confusing state of the law has been described as a “crazy quilt pattern of Supreme Court 
doctrine.”  Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court 
Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63; see also Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 
25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 353 (2003) (noting that “the complexities and arcane nuances of takings cases 
sometimes overwhelm us”); Patrick C. McGinley, Bundled Rights and Reasonable Expectations: 
Applying the Lucas Categorical Taking Rule to Severed Mineral Property Interests, 11 VT. J. OF ENVTL. 
L. 525, 544-45 (2010) (discussing the difficulty of defining the scope of property for takings analysis 
and describing caselaw as “regulatory takings pronouncements promise[] to drown the student and the 
most accomplished advocate in confusing and conflicting verbiage”). 
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conclusions can be drawn.  These conclusions indicate that private 
interests asserting takings claims in the fracking context face an uphill 
battle with several potentially difficult issues of proof.  Governments at 
the state and local level, if they determine takings claims to be a risk, 
can take steps to prepare a strong defense against those takings claims.  
For example, New York’s study of fracking and its potential impacts48 
will go a long way towards either establishing that a background 
principle or the nuisance defense precludes a taking, or that no taking 
under the Penn Central factors49 is appropriate.  Other governments 
wishing to insulate themselves from liability can conduct their own 
similar studies or cite to existing literature on the impacts and threats of 
fracking. 
In order to set the stage for applying takings law to the fracking 
context, three key background topics will be introduced.  First, a brief 
history of the development of takings jurisprudence in the Supreme 
Court will shed light on those uphill battles and the defenses available to 
governments.  Second, takings claims in the oil and gas context, 
although limited (perhaps due to a history of under-regulation of the 
industry), also will provide some context for how takings claims may 
play out in the fracking context.  Finally, the takings law of our two 
case-study jurisdictions, New York and Colorado, also will be examined 
to explore the key issues created by the federal takings framework. 
A. Development of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence 
Takings law historically applied first to the physical appropriation of 
property, specifically real property.  Thus, early takings claims based on 
government regulation of property were framed as de facto physical 
takings without just compensation.50  The Supreme Court, however, did 
not take the bait and rejected the analogy to eminent domain cases, 
holding that exercise of the police power to restrict the use of private 
property “is very different from taking property for public use.”51  Thus, 
regulatory takings (as commonly understood) were squarely rejected in 
the nineteenth century:  “[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property 
for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the 
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be 
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public 
 48. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, A PUBLIC HEALTH REVIEW OF HIGH VOLUME HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 5-8 (2014). 
 49. See discussion infra Part III(A)(1)(a).  
 50. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1887). 
 51. Id. at 669. 
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benefit.”52  Only in the twentieth century did the Supreme Court change 
course and hold that “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.”53  Thus, the concept of “regulatory takings” was born.   
1. The Rise of Regulatory Takings 
The development of regulatory takings jurisprudence has charted an 
erratic course as the Supreme Court has attempted to create workable 
standards that could be applied to regulatory takings claims.  The Court 
developed a balancing test to weigh relevant factors but also attempted 
to streamline the process by injecting some categorical rules.  All of the 
regulatory takings tests, however, are centered around the same goal.  
“Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent 
to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private 
property or ousts the owner from his domain.  Accordingly, each of 
these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that 
government imposes upon private property rights.”54 
However, for the purposes of this Article, the history is not as 
important as the result.  As takings law currently stands, the pendulum 
has swung back towards the balancing test.  Thus, this Article briefly 
will explore the dominant balancing test that courts have been instructed 
to apply in most instances.  However, the categorical rule regarding 
“total takings” also will be presented, because fracking-takings plaintiffs 
inevitably will seek to shoehorn their case under this test rather than 
give full consideration to the entirety of circumstances, including the 
police power justifications for a particular regulation. 
 52. Id. at 668-69. 
 53. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).  An alternate approach, laid out by 
numerous previous courts, would not have been to say that compensation is due if regulation goes too 
far, but rather to test whether the regulation in question falls outside of the government’s police power.  
“If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or 
the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights 
secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the 
constitution.”  Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661.  Rather than leaving the issue largely to the legislative branches 
to sort out, the Supreme Court chose to dive headlong into the regulatory takings concept, creating a 
complicated, confusing, and indeterminate system placing real and significant limits on the ability of all 
levels of government to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of their communities.  Id. 
 54. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).  The Supreme Court also 
discussed a third category of regulatory takings which are not relevant here, a category which includes 
both permanent physical invasions as well as the exactions cases.  Id.  (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374 (1994), Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)).  Perhaps the exactions cases might come up in the future 
if the government action being challenged was not state or local bans on fracking but instead 
government land use approval that imposed limitations on fracking as an exaction or condition of 
approval.  However, prohibiting the use of fracking as part of approving local land uses would not be 
very analogous to the situation in Nollan and Dolan, which the Court compared to appropriation of an 
easement over the relevant property. 
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a. The Default – the Balancing Test of Penn Central 
The hallmark of modern regulatory takings law is that each case 
involves “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” based on the “particular 
circumstances” of each case rather than any “set formula” for 
determining if a taking has occurred.55  The factors to be considered 
were laid out most prominently by Justice Brennan in the Penn Central 
case.56  The non-exclusive57 list of factors to be considered includes (1) 
the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; 
and (3) the character of the government action.58  However, ultimately, 
the factors are to be used by courts to determine “when ‘justice and 
fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons.”59  The ultimate conclusion in most 
takings cases “necessarily requires a weighing of the private and public 
interests.”60  Regulatory takings cases thus are not susceptible to simple 
analyses, but involve detailed factual findings that can inform the 
court’s balancing of the relevant interests.61 
In order to determine the economic impact of the regulation on the 
property, courts must first determine the proper scope of the property 
right in a particular case.62  Courts look not simply to the absolute 
economic impact of the regulation, but rather to how much economic 
value remains in the property after the regulation is applied.  Because 
 55. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  The ad hoc nature of 
the inquiry recently has been reiterated by the Supreme Court, when it stated “no magic formula enables 
a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference with property is a taking” and 
noted the “few invariable rules” that have been recognized in takings law.  Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n 
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012).  Regulatory takings are quite distinct from condemnations 
and physical takings, which typically involve application of per se rules.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. 
Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).  Instead, regulatory takings jurisprudence “is 
characterized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’ . . . designed to allow ‘careful examination of all 
the relevant circumstances.’”  Id. (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104; Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606 
(2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 56. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.  
 57. Although Justice Brennan notes only that these are “several factors that have particular 
significance,” id., in practice these are typically the only factors discussed by courts.  However, the 
factors are sufficiently broad-reaching that the factors are not overly restrictive. 
 58. Id. at 124. 
 59. Id. (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). 
 60. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). 
 61. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17 (“When the government condemns or physically 
appropriates the property, the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed.  When, however, the 
owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that 
they are tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and 
the analysis is more complex.”). 
 62. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987). 
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the economic impact depends on the value of the underlying property, 
takings claimants have an incentive to define the property interest 
narrowly, while government has the opposite incentive.  This tension 
inevitably has led to what is described as the “denominator problem.”63  
However, in general, courts instruct that the “parcel as a whole” is the 
relevant scope of the inquiry.64 
Under the “parcel as a whole” standard, courts have rejected attempts 
by private property owners to define their property rights narrowly.  The 
“parcel as a whole rule has three basic dimensions: horizontal, vertical, 
and temporal.”65  Thus, courts have refused to consider air rights 
separately (for development purposes),66 temporary restrictions on 
development rights,67 restrictions only on commercial uses of eagle 
feathers,68 and restrictions on only a portion of property, such as setback 
requirements.69  Under this standard, “where an owner possesses a full 
‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle 
is not a taking.”70  Although the Supreme Court for a time questioned 
the legitimacy of the “parcel as a whole” requirement,71 it has been 
reaffirmed.72 
In determining the economic impact of the regulation, courts look not 
just to the diminution in value compared to the parcel as a whole, but 
also to the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct 
investment-backed expectations.  This second factor in the Penn Central 
analysis has several key components.  First, the timing of when the 
regulation was enacted in relation to when the property interest was 
 63. The denominator problem is examined more fully infra Part II.A.3.   
 64. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978); Animas 
Valley Sand & Gravel v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59, 69 (Colo. 2001).  This Article focuses on the 
separation of property into less than a fee simple estate, and does not examine the case of breaking 
property into portions which are developed at separate times, because presumably regulations or bans on 
fracking apply the entire property owned, even if that property is just the mineral estate.  Courts have 
recently taken a more narrow view of what constitutes the “parcel as a whole” when development occurs 
in pieces over time.  See, e.g., Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 707 F.3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
 65. Daniel L. Siegal, How the History and Purpose of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine Help to 
Define the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 603, 604 (2012).  “Horizontal refers to the land surface 
(‘metes and bounds’); vertical to air space and subsurface rights; and temporal to past and future uses of 
the land.”  Id.  For a different take on the parcel as a whole, from a proponent of greater protection of 
private property under the Takings Clause, see Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of 
Ownership and the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549 (2012). 
 66. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130. 
 67. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. 
 68. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
 69. See generally Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927). 
 70. Allard, 444 U.S. at 65-66. 
 71. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). 
 72. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. 
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acquired is relevant, though not dispositive, in determining the 
reasonableness of the property owner’s expectations.73  Second, 
investment-backed expectations must be reasonably probable rather than 
speculative—not “starry eyed hope of winning the jackpot if the law 
changes.”74  Third, courts look to whether the owner was operating in a 
“highly regulated industry.”75  Fourth, courts examine whether there was 
notice of the problem that spawned the need for the regulation.76  Fifth, 
courts assess whether the owner might have “reasonably anticipated” the 
regulation in light of the “regulatory environment” at the time of 
purchase.77  Finally, the expectations of others on whether the regulation 
will be followed are also relevant in determining the impact on 
investment-backed expectations.78 
The last Penn Central factor deals with the character of the 
government action.  As the Court explained in Penn Central, takings 
“may more readily be found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by the government . . . than when 
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”79  If the 
regulation in question was designed to promote public health, safety, 
and welfare, regardless of whether it prevents a nuisance, the character 
of the government action weighs against finding a taking.80  Another 
aspect of this factor is the purposes served and the effects produced by 
the regulation—thus courts must look not just at the economic impact of 
 73. Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2012) (O’Connor, J., concurring). T he Supreme Court 
has rejected postenactment purchase as a categorical defense against a taking, holding that the 
government “may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”  Id. at 627.  Justice 
O’Connor explained in her concurring opinion that “the regulatory regime in place at the time the 
claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those [distinct investment-
backed] expectations.”  Id. at 633. 
 74. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).  The court 
acknowledged that property owners might pay “a slight speculative premium” based on the theory that 
the regulatory restriction might someday end, but that such speculation does not qualify as a protected 
“expectation.”  Id. 
 75. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The court 
explained that a party in a highly regulated environment “necessarily understands that it can expect the 
regulatory regime to impose some restraints on its” property, the right to mine coal, in this case.  Id. 
 76. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that there 
was no suggestion the claimant “was unaware that surface mining was a potentially environmentally 
hazardous activity”). 
 77. Id. (discussing the ability of the claimant to reasonably anticipate the possibility of an 
adverse administrative finding which would limit its right to mine coal). 
 78. Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1122 (noting the investment-backed expectations of tenants who 
reasonably expect rent control regulations to remain in place).  This factor has also been described as the 
“average reciprocity of advantage” secured by a regulatory scheme, which serves to justify restrictions 
on property.  See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 79. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 80. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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the regulation but also at the public purpose such as the avoidance of 
impending harm absent regulation.81  Scholars have noted that the 
character of the government action factor is consistent with, but not 
identical to, the nuisance background principles defense.82 
b. The Categorical Rule – Lucas “Total Takings” 
The primary categorical rule of relevance to this Article is the per se 
taking rule based on deprivation of “all economically viable use of 
property” announced in the Lucas case.  Takings law contains very few 
per se rules,83 but the “total taking” rule is the most prominent.  As a 
result, if a claimant can show that he has been denied all economically 
beneficial use of his property, then there is no need to assess the full set 
of circumstances surrounding the case using the Penn Central factors.  
In effect, this categorical rule cuts out the “character of the government 
action” factor and puts primary emphasis on the “economic impact 
factor.”  The “interference with distinct investment-backed 
expectations” factor is not explicitly considered, although one could 
argue that the “background principles” defense subsumes most, if not 
all, of that factor.   
As with most categorical rules, the total takings rule is simple to state 
but often complicated to apply.84  Under the Lucas framework, courts 
are required to “simply” determine what the relevant property interest is 
and then determine whether any economically beneficial use remains the 
property.  As discussed more fully below, this makes the determination 
 81. Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  On remand, the 
court in Rhode Island emphasized the many public harms justified by the wetlands regulations at issue 
and even found that construction in the area would damage public trust interests and constitute a 
nuisance, effectively overcoming the relatively minor economic impact.  ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 920 (4th ed. 2010). 
 82. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 525, 571 (2009). 
 83. “Quite simply, there are very few per se rules in regulatory takings cases.”  Lost Tree Vill. 
Corp. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 412, 430 n.28 (2011), rev’d on other grounds, 707 F.3d 1286 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
 84. Of course, as pointed out by the dissent in Lucas, the trial court’s finding that the relevant 
property was valueless was absurd.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1033, 1044 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Instead, almost inevitably any property subject to regulation will have some 
remaining value.  The Supreme Court has held that $200,000 of residual value was enough to mean the 
property was not left “economically idle,” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631, but it has not provided any clear 
guidance on how much value is enough.  This problem is magnified in the oil and gas context, where the 
“value” of the relevant property interest depends on many factors, most notably the cost of production 
and the price obtained for the oil and gas.  Because these factors can shift dramatically in very short time 
periods due to changes in technology, operational efficiency, global supply and demand, or even 
international relations, relying on the economic viability of producing oil and gas, with or without a 
particular technique such as fracking, is especially problematic.  Profits of $10 million today could 
easily turn to only $500,000 or even a net loss tomorrow. 
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of the proper scope of the property right to be determinative of the 
outcome.85  However, the test is not so simple as to end there, for the 
Lucas court recognized that “background principles” such as nuisance 
law might provide a defense to these categorical total takes.86  
Therefore, courts must go beyond assessing the economic impact to also 
analyze  
the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or 
adjacent private property, posed by the claimant’s 
proposed activities . . ., the social value of the claimant’s 
activities and their suitability to the locality in question . 
. ., and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can 
be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and 
the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike.87 
This defense has come to be known as the “background principles” 
defense based on language from Lucas describing these as “background 
principles of nuisance and property law.”88  Subsequent court decisions 
and scholars have noted that this analysis applies not just in total takings 
cases but can operate as a defense even in the default Penn Central 
balancing cases.89 
Lucas is an interesting and unusual case for several reasons.  First, as 
explained by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion, a regulation will 
deprive a property owner of all economically beneficial use of property 
in only “extraordinary circumstances.”90  Second, the finding of a total 
take was highly questionable and ignored the remaining value in the 
property that did not involve development of single-family residences, 
such as use for recreation or camping.91  Third, the state actually had 
 85. This issue, the “denominator problem,” is discussed infra Part III.A.3.  This test is highly 
subject to manipulation by prospective litigants as well as to indeterminate outcomes from courts. 
 86. “Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial 
use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the 
owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”  Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1027. 
 87. Id. at 1030-31 (internal citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 1030. 
 89. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Coalition for 
Gov’t Procurement v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 365 F.3d 435, 481 (6th Cir. 2004); Michael C. Blumm & 
Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings 
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 325-26 (2005) (citing those and other cases). 
 90. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.  The majority only recognizes the “extraordinary” nature of this 
finding once in its opinion.  However, the dissent from Justice Blackmun emphasizes this point as well 
in arguing that the majority was making a dramatic change in takings law in order to address a very rare 
circumstance, using the memorable phrase “[t]oday the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse.”  Id. at 
1036.  Future development of takings law has confirmed that only rarely can plaintiffs demonstrate a 
total taking has occurred.  See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 322. 
 91. The trial court’s finding that the property had lost all economic value was not reviewed by 
the appellate courts in South Carolina or the Supreme Court, which instead based its decision on the 
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amended the relevant law in a way that might have allowed for a special 
use permit for the sought-after development.  This highlighted the fact 
that the law can, and often does, change, thus calling into question the 
possibility for regulation ever to entirely take all value of a property.92  
Despite these unusual aspects of the case, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless proceeded to announce what was seen at the time as a 
dramatic alteration of existing takings law, inserting a categorical rule to 
replace the default balancing test of Penn Central.   
2. Background Principles – a Defense to Takings Claims 
The Lucas case recast many earlier takings decisions93 and focused 
future cases on weighing, as an initial matter, whether the proposed use 
of property would be permissible under “background principles” of 
property or nuisance law.  Although the Lucas case itself focused 
primarily on nuisance law,94 subsequent cases have identified numerous 
other background principles which may apply. 
The Lucas case examined in some detail what it would take for a 
government to invoke nuisance as a “background principles” defense.  
First, the Supreme Court made clear that background principles provide 
assumption that finding was correct.  However, Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent that the 
conclusion “is almost certainly erroneous” because the owner retained important property rights such as 
the right to exclude others, the right to alienate the land for its remaining value, or the right to use the 
land to “picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a moveable trailer.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1044.   
 92. Id. at 1011-12.  In effect, the court was deciding a “temporary takings” case, although the 
Supreme Court later clarified its position on temporary takings in the Tahoe-Sierra case, where it upheld 
a moratorium against development lasting 32 months against a takings challenge, finding that 
compensation was not required under those circumstances.  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002). 
 93. For example, the Mugler case was distinguished as being a “generally applicable criminal 
prohibition on the manufacturing of alcoholic beverages” rather than “a regulation specifically directed 
to land use.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 n.14 (emphasis added).  Several other cases, such as Nollan, 
Agins, and Euclid, were converted from cases prohibiting “harmful or noxious use” to cases affirming 
that regulation is not a taking if it “substantially advances legitimate state interests.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. 
1023-24.  Ultimately, the Court distinguished earlier cases which could readily be interpreted to support 
a broader police power defense to takings claims because they did not involve allegations that “the 
regulation wholly eliminated the value of claimant’s land.”  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026 (citing Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 513-14 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).  
For example, the Goldblatt case was re-characterized as one where “other uses [were] permitted”, 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026 n.13, even though the Goldblatt decision repeatedly points out that the 
regulation “completely prohibits a beneficial use to which the property has previously been devoted,” 
and that the claimant argued that the regulation “would confiscate the entire mining utility of their 
property.”  Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592, 596 (1962).  No taking was found in 
that case even though “the use prohibited [was] arguably not a common-law nuisance.”  Id. at 593.  The 
Lucas court similarly reimagined the decisions from Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) and 
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).  See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1048. 
 94. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-32. 
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an affirmative defense, and thus the burden is on the government agency 
to prove that the use would be prohibited under the background 
principles.95  Second, the Lucas court emphasized that the government 
must do more than rely on legislative findings that the use of property 
would be against the public interest,96 thus rejecting broad assertions of 
immunity based on the police power.  Third, background principles must 
have existed for some time and cannot have been “newly legislated or 
decreed (without compensation).”97  Finally, the Lucas court cited some 
broadly-applicable issues to be resolved in answering this question, 
relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts rather than the specific 
nuisance law in South Carolina.98 
The nuisance exception has been applied as a defense in many cases 
after the Lucas decision was announced.99  Colorado applied the 
nuisance background principle defense to deny a takings claim where 
the proposed action would have spread radioactive contamination, 
basing its ruling on common law principles.100  Other states have relied 
on public nuisance statutes.  For example, government installation of 
groundwater monitoring wells was found to be immune to a takings 
challenge because the contamination of groundwater constituted a public 
nuisance under the California code.101  Florida found that compensation 
was not required where a city mandated closure of a hotel that had 
become inextricably entwined with drug and nuisance activity.102   
Ultimately, the nuisance defense will depend on the particulars of 
state nuisance law.  But the Restatement (Second) of Torts does provide 
some helpful guidelines.  A nuisance may be either public or private.103  
Public nuisance is based on interference with a right common to the 
public, such as public health, public safety, the public peace, the public 
comfort, or the public convenience.104  Private nuisance is based on an 
 95. Id. at 1031 (“South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance and property 
law that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently 
found.”); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 326. 
 96. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. 
 97. Id. at 1029.  This part of the Lucas decision was not joined by Justice Kennedy, who 
explained in his concurrence that “[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the 
exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society.  The state should not be 
prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions, and courts must 
consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source.”  Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. at 1030-31. 
 99. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 335. 
 100. Colo. Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994). 
 101. Hendler v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 611 (1997). 
 102. Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 876 (Fla. 2001). 
 103. Restatement (Second) of Torts: Nuisance § 821A (1979). 
 104. Id. § 821B.  Courts also will examine a variety of factors such as the gravity of the harm, the 
utility of the conduct, and whether the invasion was intentional.  Id. §§ 825, 827, 828. 
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invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, 
which includes the right to freedom from discomfort and annoyance 
while using the land.105  The harm must be more than slight 
inconvenience or petty annoyance, but, rather, a significant harm.106   
Lucas did not limit the background principles defense to nuisance, but 
instead opened the door for a range of other legal doctrines to work as 
affirmative defenses to takings claims.  Scholars have noted the success 
of background principles defenses107 based on the public trust doctrine, 
the natural use doctrine,108 the federal navigational servitude,109 
customary rights—particularly of indigenous people’s rights,110 water 
rights restrictions,111 the wildlife trust,112 and treaty rights of Native 
Americans.113  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also has recognized 
another background principle that may provide a defense to takings 
claims—the environmental rights amendment embodied in the state 
constitution.114  Citizens in Colorado have cited to their own 
constitution, which protects inalienable rights to protect their lives, 
liberties, and property, as justification for passing local bans or 
moratoria on fracking.115  The application of these and other background 
principles to the fracking context will be discussed in Part III.A. 
The effect that the Lucas decision on takings law has been to create 
an initial opportunity for the government to raise a defense based on 
background principles.  If the government is able to prove that a 
background principle could impose the same limit as the regulation, then 
no compensation is required.  Only once the court has moved past this 
“logically antecedent inquiry”116 can the takings claimant seek recovery 
based on the “total taking” per se rule. 
 105. Id. § 821D cmt. b. 
 106. Id. § 821F cmt. c. 
 107. For a comprehensive discussion of these defenses, see Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 
341-54. 
 108. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette Cty., 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 F.3d 790, 795 (3d Cir 1996). 
 110. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (custom of beach access 
prevented taking); Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cty. Planning Comm’n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 
1995) (native Hawaiian gathering rights). 
 111. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 350-52. 
 112. John D. Echeverria & Julia Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife 
Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 376-81 (2003). 
 113. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 89, at 354. 
 114. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 946-50 (Pa. 2013). 
 115. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 116. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
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3. The Denominator Problem 
Once any background principles defense to a takings claim has been 
resolved, courts must next determine the scope of the property right 
against which the regulation’s impact is to be measured.  This analysis 
presents the denominator problem.  The denominator problem will 
feature prominently in any litigation over takings in the fracking context 
because even bans on fracking outright cannot be said to deprive all 
value of the property unless the property is divided at least down to a 
severed mineral interest. 
The denominator problem has been identified since the inception of 
regulatory takings jurisprudence.  In his dissent in Mahon, Justice 
Brandeis argued that “If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in 
place by the restriction, we should compare it with the value of all the 
parts of the land.  That is, with the value not of the coal alone, but with 
the value of the whole property.”117  Justice Brandeis specifically 
cautioned against attempts by property owners to increase their rights by 
“dividing the interests in his property into subsurface and soil.”118  
Despite these objections, the majority in Mahon found a taking based on 
the reasoning that “to make it commercially impracticable to mine 
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes 
as appropriating or destroying it.”119   
Numerous scholars also have addressed the denominator problem.  
Professor Sax highlighted the issue in an important article attempting to 
create a consistent theory for takings cases.120  Professor Sax lamented 
the “unworkable problem of definition” inherent in the diminution in 
value test and the “terrible complexities” of trying to identify the 
property at issue in a takings case.121  Professor Michelman further 
elaborated on the issue and coined the name by which it is now known 
when he explained that the “question is raised of how to define the 
‘particular thing’ whose value is to furnish the denominator of the 
fraction.”122  Professor Michelman then went on to raise the rhetorical 
question: 
Suppose I am forbidden to remove gravel from my land  
. . . Inasmuch as mining rights are well recognized, 
divisible interests in land, . . . why not say that any land 
 117. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
 118. Id.   
 119. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).   
 120. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61-67 (1964). 
 121. Id. at 60. 
 122. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations 
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967) (emphasis added). 
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consists of two ‘things’—mining rights and surface 
rights, . . . and that the relevant denominator in testing a 
regulation which impinges only on mining rights . . . is 
the value of those rights—which the regulation totally 
destroys?123   
Professor Michelman questions any reliance on divided interests in 
land, such as severed mineral interests.124  Of course other scholars, 
particularly those who advocate for a stronger property rights stance, 
argue that dividing up the property is appropriate in the takings 
analysis.125 
The denominator problem also was famously discussed in Lucas 
itself.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas briefly touches on the 
denominator problem when it notes the “inconsistent pronouncements 
by the Court” in similar cases such as Mahon and Keystone.126  Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent goes into more detail regarding the issue, pointing 
out that the issue “cannot be determined objectively.”127  Justice 
Blackmun cites Professor Michelman on the topic:  “We have long 
understood that any land-use regulation can be characterized as the 
‘total’ deprivation of an aptly defined entitlement . . . Alternatively, the 
same regulation can always be characterized as a mere ‘partial’ 
withdrawal from full, unencumbered ownership of the landholding 
affected by the regulation.”128  Justice Stevens’ dissent goes even 
further, calling out the “arbitrariness of such a rule” and noting that 
courts can read property rights broadly, while developers and investors 
can sell “specialized estates to take advantage of the Court’s new 
 123. Id. at 1193 (emphasis in original). 
 124. Id. at 1230 (“Holmes intimated strongly [in Mahon] that the separation in ownership of the 
mining rights from the balance of the fee, prior to enactment of the restriction, was critically important 
to the petitioner’s victory.  But why should this be so?  We can see that if one owns the mining rights 
only, but not the residual fee, then a regulation forbidding mining totally devalues the owner’s stake in 
‘that’ land.  But is there any reason why it should matter whether one owns, in addition to mining rights, 
residuary rights in the same parcel (which may be added to the denominator so as probably to reduce the 
fraction of value destroyed below what is necessary for compensability) or residuary rights in some 
other parcel (which will not be added to the denominator)?”). 
 125. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
(1985). 
 126. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). The Lucas majority 
suggested that the “answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner’s reasonable expectations 
have been shaped by the State’s law of property” but avoided the issue in that case because the property 
interest was an interest in land.  Id.  Under the majority’s speculation, the scope of property interest 
might be based on “whether and to what degree the State’s law has accorded legal recognition and 
protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a 
diminution in (or elimination of) value.”  Id. 
 127. Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 128. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1988); see also Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Michelman, supra). 
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rule.”129   
Both the majority and Justice Blackmun’s dissent pointed to the 
divergent outcomes in Mahon and Keystone as examples of the 
indeterminate nature of this inquiry.130  Although similar in many 
respects, the decision in Keystone was careful to analyze whether a 
taking had occurred not based on an analogy to the Mahon case, but 
rather on the “particular facts” of the case.131  The similarities between 
the effect of the regulation, which required that some coal not be mined 
in order to prevent subsidence, created “obvious and necessary reasons 
for distinguishing” Mahon.132  The key distinguishing factors 
highlighted by Justice Stevens were (1) that the “character of the 
governmental action involved here leans heavily against a finding of a 
taking[,]” because the regulation was created to prevent “what it 
perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare;”133 and (2) 
there was no evidence to show that the regulation “makes it impossible 
for petitioners to profitably engage in their business.”134  The second of 
those distinguishing factors is relevant for the denominator problem.  
The parties in the case below sought to avoid the “complex and 
voluminous proofs” that would be required to demonstrate the actual 
impact that the law would have on the coal company, and so the 
Keystone Court simply rejected a facial challenge to the law.135  Thus, 
the key difference between Mahon and Keystone was that in the earlier 
case, the Court had found that the mining of “certain coal” was 
commercially impracticable, while in the latter case there was no 
evidence of any actual harm to the claimant.136  Yet, the Court did 
implicitly touch on the denominator problem when it faulted the coal 
company for failing to introduce evidence “that the Act makes it 
commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their 
 129. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Of course, some of those specialized 
estates already existed, such as severed mineral interests.  Combined with the proliferation of local and 
state regulations or bans on fracking, the severed mineral estate has the potential to create the perfect 
storm of manipulation that Justice Stevens anticipated.  Professor Patrick McGinley has noted that 
recognition of smaller and smaller severed mineral interests “provides the opportunity to ‘game’ the 
system to allow manipulation of less than fee simple estates in land to facilitate takings claims.”  
McGinley, supra note 47, at 577. 
 130. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7, 1054. 
 131. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 474 (1987).   
 132. Id. at 484. 
 133. Id. at 485.  This finding alone is enough to distinguish the cases, and so Mahon can be seen 
not as a case about diminution of property value, specifically the entirety of mining rights for certain 
coal, but rather as a case where the de facto appropriation of property was not done for a “public 
purpose.”  Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (eminent domain could not be used 
when land was not taken for “public use”). 
 134. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485. 
 135. Id. at 493. 
 136. Id. 
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bituminous coal interests in western Pennsylvania” or identifying “a 
single mine that  can no longer be mined for profit.”137  This discussion 
implies that the Court was taking a broad view of what property interest 
must be used for the denominator. 
Ultimately, the denominator problem is still an issue that plagues 
federal takings law.138  State law may shed some light into how the 
problem is to be resolved in particular states.139  However, the Supreme 
Court has looked beyond state property law to define the relevant 
property interest more broadly.140  A few courts have identified some 
helpful factors for deciding the appropriate scope of the property 
interest.141  Yet the issue is particularly problematic for the fracking 
context, where mineral rights, including rights to oil and gas, often are 
severed from surface rights in land.  Fracking-takings thus present an 
interesting application of takings law to a new context, and one with 
incredibly high stakes not just for mineral owners, but also for local 
governments and neighboring residents who would be affected by 
fracking operations. 
4. Temporary Limitations on Property 
One final aspect of takings law is important to discuss, given that 
several governments have taken the step of placing a moratorium on 
fracking, rather than restricting it outright in a permanent ban.  Thus, a 
moratorium implicates not the geographic scope of property or the rights 
 137. Id. at 495-96. 
 138. Unsurprisingly, the Court of Federal Claims is the federal court that has most often dealt with 
the issue.  That court has held that a royalty interest in minerals is a compensable interest for Fifth 
Amendment takings purposes, although it held off ruling whether a takings had occurred in that case.  
Cane Tenn., Inc., v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 785, 792 (1999).  However, in a later decision in that case 
the court held that the denominator to be considered was the parcel as a whole, including uses of the 
surface estate such as for timber.  Cane Tenn., Inc., v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 108 (2002).  Even 
when the property owner owns more than just the mineral estate, however, a taking might still be bound 
if the regulation involves “the total destruction of all economically viable use.”  See, e.g., Whitney 
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991).  One attorney from the Department of 
Justice has noted that it remains an open question in the Federal Circuit whether the Lucas categorical 
taking rule applies to a partial interest in property, such as a mineral estate, and has called for clear 
resolution of this issue.  See Kristine S. Tardiff, Closing the Last Lucas Loophole:  The Partial Interest 
Problem, in THE 12TH ANNUAL CLE CONF. ON LITIGATING REG. TAKINGS AND OTHER LEGAL 
CHALLENGES TO LAND USE & ENVTL. REG. (Vt. L. Sch. 2009). 
 139. State-specific takings law for New York and Colorado are discussed infra Part III.C. 
 140. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 500 (1987) (refusing to 
treat the support estate as a separate parcel even though state law recognized it as a distinct property 
interest). 
 141. See, e.g., District Intown Prop. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 880 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (identifying factors to include “the degree of continuity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to 
which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which the restricted lots benefit the 
unregulated lot.”). 
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to make particular use of property; rather, a moratorium implicates the 
temporal dimension of the bundle of rights. 
The leading and most recent case on takings based on a temporary 
taking rejected finding a categorical per se taking, even if the regulation 
deprives the property owner of all economic use of property, instead 
affirming the need to apply the balancing test embodied in Penn 
Central.142  Thus, in the Tahoe-Sierra case, the Supreme Court rejected 
arguments that the categorical rule from Lucas should be extended to 
temporary takings.143  Instead of extending the categorical rule, the 
Court said that the answer to the question of whether a moratorium on 
development constitutes a taking “is neither ‘yes, always’ nor ‘no, 
never’; the answer depends upon the particular circumstances of the 
case.”144  In support of this determination, the Court explained that the 
“parcel as a whole” standard from Penn Central meant that destruction 
of one strand in the bundle of rights is not a taking.145  Thus in this case, 
the Supreme Court found it to be error that the district court had 
“disaggregated petitioners’ property rights into temporal segments 
corresponding to the regulations at issue and then analyzed whether 
petitioners were deprived of all economically viable use during each 
period.”146  Instead, the Court affirmed that the “parcel as a whole” rule 
applies and that the denominator problem could not be resolved through 
the “circular” reasoning of defining the property interest affected by the 
regulation in terms of what portion of the property was affected by the 
regulation.147   
On the other hand, the temporary nature of the restriction could not 
act as a shield.148  An additional justification for rejecting a categorical 
take rule for moratoria was the “interest in facilitating informed 
decisionmaking by regulatory agencies[,]” which would be undermined 
if officials were forced to rush through the planning process for fear of 
takings liability.149  Ultimately, the Court found that a 32 month 
moratorium did not amount to a taking, rejecting calls to set a 
 142. Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320-21 (2002).  
Because the finding of the lower courts based on Penn Central was not challenged, the Court was able 
to dispose the case simply by declaring that Penn Central provided the appropriate test for this case.  Id. 
at 321 n.16.  Notably, this case was argued by the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John 
Roberts, as the attorney for the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.  Id. at 305. 
 143. Id. at 321. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 327. 
 146. Id. at 331. 
 147. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331. 
 148. Id. at 337. 
 149. Id. at 339. 
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presumptive limit for the duration that is allowed.150 
The question still remains: under what circumstances does a 
moratorium or other temporary limitation amount to a taking?  The 
answer courts have developed is whether the limitation amounts to an 
“extraordinary delay” in governmental decisionmaking.151  However an 
“extraordinary delay” typically must last for a long time, and courts 
have rejected temporary takings claims where the delay took seven to 
eight years.152  Some factors that courts look to in determining if an 
“extraordinary delay” has occurred include bad faith by the government, 
the nature of the permitting process, and the reasons for any delay.153 
Thus it is now settled law that a moratorium is neither always nor 
never a taking and must instead be analyzed using the Penn Central 
factors.  In those cases where the balancing test leads to a conclusion 
that a taking has occurred, the court still must determine the appropriate 
remedy for the takings claim.  The remedy question was squarely 
presented in the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. Los Angeles case, where the Court reviewed a ruling from the 
California Supreme Court that monetary compensation was not due for 
the temporary take that occurs from the time a restriction is enacted until 
the time that it is enjoined as a taking without just compensation.154  In 
that case, the Court rejected the idea that claims for a taking are limited 
to nonmonetary relief, instead holding that landowners are entitled to 
bring an action in inverse condemnation under the Takings Clause.155  
The Court was clear that it was not passing on the issue of whether a 
temporary take had occurred,156 however, on remand, the California 
courts determined that no take had in fact occurred, and so no 
compensation was due.157 
If a temporary restriction on property is found to be a taking, the 
question still remains of how to put a value on the compensation 
required.  The First English Court hinted that the value may be based on 
“the value of the use of the land during this period,” but did not 
 150. Id. at 341-42 (“[W]e could not possibly conclude that every delay of over one year is 
constitutionally unacceptable,” especially where the district court found 32 months to be reasonable.). 
 151. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v.  United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 152. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 472 U.S. 172 (1985) (delay of 
eight years); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (delay of seven years). 
 153. Bass Enter. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Tabb 
Lakes, 10 F.3d at 799; quoting Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098). 
 154. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S 304, 311 (1987). 
 155. Id. at 315. 
 156. Id. at 313. 
 157. Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 329 (2002) 
(citing First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989)). 
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explicitly say how the compensation should be valued in that case.158  
Yet the Court was equally clear that it was based on an allegation of 
total denial of use of the property and did not intend to apply to “normal 
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, 
variances, and the like.”159  This case however assumed that the lease of 
the land would be simply for use that would leave the land in the same 
state as it was prior to the start of the lease.  Fracking-takings, 
particularly temporary takings, will raise entirely distinct issues of 
valuation. 
B. Takings in the Oil and Gas Industry 
The law of takings in the oil and gas context is not nearly as well 
developed as the law is in regards to other mineral interests such as coal, 
gravel, or sand, nor as developed as takings law with respect to 
restrictions on development of land for commercial or other economic 
purposes.160  The relatively few cases that have examined takings claims 
in relation to oil and gas development are discussed in this Part, along 
with analogous cases from other mineral takings cases.  Additionally, 
some of the unique background principles that apply to oil and gas are 
worth considering, such as the “reasonable use” restrictions on the right 
of severed mineral interest owners to occupy the surface in order to 
extract minerals.   
The key initial issue for takings of oil and gas is defining the scope of 
property rights in oil and gas, or the mineral estate more broadly.  In 
New York, Colorado, and many other states, the right to extract minerals 
from the subsurface can be and often has been severed from ownership 
of the surface estate, thus creating a related but distinct mineral estate.  
The severance of the mineral estate often was accomplished by deed 
which transferred ownership of the surface while explicitly retaining the 
mineral rights.   
Even if severed, the mineral estate includes more than simply the 
right to extract oil and gas through fracking.  As an initial matter, 
limitations on fracking do not prevent future extraction of minerals by 
techniques that do not involve fracking.  Bans on fracking do not 
actually take the resource because the oil and gas remains under ground, 
 158. First English, 482 U.S. at 319. 
 159. Id. at 321. 
 160. One reason for the lack of development in the law in the oil and gas industry may be that 
historically the industry has been significantly under-regulated.  Only recently, as developments in 
technology and concerns about the health, safety, and environmental impacts from fracking have 
become better understood, have governments begun enacting strict regulations or even bans on the oil 
and gas industry. 
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to be extracted in the future if the ban is lifted or if new technologies are 
developed.  Additionally, in many areas oil and gas were produced 
without the use of fracking.161  Going even beyond the oil and gas 
context, mineral rights include rights to mine coal, sand, gravel, and 
other minerals as well.162  In Colorado, for example, the Boulder-Weld 
coalfield overlays, to a large extent, the Wattenberg field, the most 
significant area of oil and gas development along the Front Range.  To 
the extent coal was previously extracted from this area, it might provide 
another barrier to a fracking-takings claim based on the same mineral 
estates. 
A fee simple property interest in the mineral estate might not even be 
the subject of a takings claim, as mineral rights often are leased.  In such 
a situation, a company which had entered an oil and gas lease has 
brought a takings claim against Dallas.163  Oil and gas leases add several 
dimensions to a takings claim, particularly where a moratorium may 
cause a lease to be extinguished before the moratorium ends.164  Another 
even smaller slice of the property interest in mineral rights is a royalty 
interest.  “[T]he owner of a mere royalty interest has no present or 
prospective possessory interest in the land; . . . owns no part of the 
minerals (as such) in place; . . . does not become a cotenant in the 
mineral estate; . . . and [the royalty] interest is merely a present vested 
incorporeal interest in the land.”165  Similarly, rights to extract oil and 
gas often are described as a profit à prendre, which is “a right to remove 
a part of the substance of the land.”166  Another potential complication is 
that oil and gas historically were viewed as subject to the rule of capture, 
although the Texas Supreme Court recently found that groundwater, 
while subject to the rule of capture, still could be owned in place and 
therefore potentially was subject to a takings claim.167 
 161. Dep. of Stuart Ellsworth at 32:1-24, May 8, 2014, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of 
Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Colo.). 
 162. Mineral rights include metals such as copper, gold, lead, molybdenum, silver, uranium, and 
zinc, as well as gemstones such as diamonds.  See Mineral Resources, COLO. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
http://coloradogeologicalsurvey.org/mineral-resources/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). 
 163. Trinity East Energy, LLC v. City of Dallas, No. DC-14-1443, 2014 WL 631055 (Dallas Cty., 
Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 13, 2014). 
 164. Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, 798 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (certifying questions to the N.Y. 
Court of Appeals regarding whether oil and gas leases are extended due to state moratorium, accepted at 
23 N.Y.3d 1047 (2014)). 
 165. Lee Jones, Jr., Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569, 569-70 (1948). 
 166. See, e.g., Atlantic Oil Co. v. Los Angeles Cty., 446 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Cal. 1986).  A profit à 
prendre “is an interest in real property in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament.”  Id.  For a more 
detailed discussion of the history of property rights in oil and gas minerals, see K.K. Duvivier, Sins of 
the Father, 1 TEXAS A&M J. OF REAL PROP. L. 391, 393-409 (2014). 
 167. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 SW.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).  Under the rule of capture, 
neighboring landowners are not liable even if they pump so much groundwater that wells on 
neighboring land dry up.  The Texas Supreme Court compared groundwater to oil and gas extensively to 
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A few states have decided takings claims based on limitations on the 
ability to mine sand and gravel.  These cases have generated mixed 
results about one of the key issues in takings—the parcel as a whole.  
Ohio, for example, has denied a takings claim where a county denied a 
conditional-use permit to allow the owner to mine sand and gravel on 
his property.168  There was no taking even though the property was 
purchased only to mine sand and gravel, because the court was required 
to look to the “parcel as a whole” which included surface rights.169  
However, an earlier case had found a taking of coal rights, which was 
deemed to be severable and had in fact been severed in that case.170  
Somewhat reconciling the two decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court 
stated, as dicta, that a “mineral estate may be considered the relevant 
parcel for a compensable regulatory taking if the mineral estate was 
purchased separately from the other interests in the real property.”171  
However, other states, such as Colorado, have rejected this view when 
squarely confronted with the issue, holding instead that the mineral 
estate must be considered along with the remainder of the bundle of 
rights.172  Separating out the mineral estate in this way would open up 
the courts and our takings jurisprudence to the manipulation that Justice 
Stevens predicted in Lucas173 and should be rejected.174   
Thus far, there have been only a handful of cases involving an inverse 
condemnation claim based on a prohibition of oil and gas drilling or 
exploration.  The earliest of those cases, which found an 
unconstitutional taking had occurred, has several key flaws.  The Court 
of Appeals of Michigan issued the decision in 1994, before the advent of 
modern fracking techniques and our growing understanding of its 
reach the conclusion that the rule of capture was not inconsistent with ownership of minerals in place.  
Id. at 828-32.  In Colorado at least, the rule of capture has been displaced by the statutory scheme of the 
Oil and Gas Conservation Act, which was enacted in part to protect the correlative rights to a shared 
common pool resource.  COLO. REV. STAT. 34-60-102(1)(a)(III).  Therefore, this Article does not wade 
into the discussion of whether the rule of capture prevents a takings claim. 
 168. State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 875 N.E.2d 59, 62 (Ohio 
2007). 
 169. Id. at 67. 
 170. R.T.G., Inc. v. State, 780 N.E.2d 998, 1009 (Ohio 2002). 
 171. Shelly Materials, 875 N.E.2d at 67. 
 172. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the Cty. of La Plata, 38 P.3d 
59, 68 (Colo. 2001). 
 173. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
 174. Professor McGinley has examined takings of mineral rights in detail, noting the several 
serious issues with extending the total taking rule to less than fee simple interest in land: “Because 
severed mineral interests have all the characteristics of personal property to which the Lucas categorical 
taking rule does not apply, the shrunken bundle of property rights inherent in severed coal property 
interests similarly should disqualify such interests from the per se protection offered by the Lucas 
categorical rule.”  McGinley, supra note 47, at 577. 
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impacts.175  The primary deficiency in the court’s analysis was in its 
resolution of the denominator problem.  The court concluded that the 
prohibition on drilling “completely deprived plaintiffs of all use of at 
least some portion of their property holdings in the protected area.”176  
The court ignored that directional drilling would allow the production of 
oil and gas beneath at least a portion of the protected area.177  
Furthermore, the court swept aside as “immaterial” the fact that the 
plaintiffs had extensive property holdings outside of the protected area 
that were not affected.178  And the court did not even address the larger 
issue of whether the “parcel as a whole” could be appropriately 
narrowed to the mineral interests.179  Another problem with the decision 
was the rejection of a nuisance defense by the government on the 
grounds that the justification was not to prevent harm on adjoining 
property, but rather to protect the surface owner’s property.180   
The final issue presented in the Michigan case was the valuation 
question.  Here, the appellate court found fault with the trial court’s 
finding of over $71 million as the required just compensation for the 
taking.181  The court found that the fair market value of the property at 
the time of the taking was not the appropriate measure of compensation.  
Instead the compensation value should have been based on the “fair 
market rental value of the property.”182  However, because of the unique 
interests in mineral rights, the calculation of the rental value of the 
property was not simple.  Ultimately, the court settled on providing 
guidance that the value might be something near the “amount of money 
they could have received in interest on [the] present value of the income 
stream” and that could have been produced if the oil and gas were 
extracted.183  The court was careful to note the taking was only 
temporary in nature, because if the prohibition on drilling was lifted in 
the future, then the plaintiff could extract the resource and a full 
compensation for taking would amount to a windfall.184 
Additionally, the Michigan Court of Appeals has backed off of the 
 175. Miller Bros. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). 
 176. Id. at 220. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Miller Bros., 513 N.W.2d at 221.  This rejection of a nuisance defense was particularly 
problematic because the surface property was owned by the federal government, and therefore any harm 
to public lands would impact the public and not just a private landowner.  Additionally, if 
fracking/takings claimants argue that the mineral estate should be treated as a separate property interest, 
then the surface estate should not be treated differently than neighboring properties. 
 181. Id. at 220.   
 182. Id. at 223. 
 183. Id. at 224. 
 184. Id. at 223. 
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approach taken in the Miller Brothers case in a more recent takings case 
related to restrictions on drilling for oil and gas.  The court was asked to 
consider takings claims related to the denial of permits to drill oil and 
gas wells on private property located within a state forest subject to a 
comprehensive management plan.185  The court rejected a categorical 
takings claim because of the remaining value in the land, such as 
operation of wells in a limited development region or use of horizontal 
wells, even if the other options would increase costs or not result in a 
profit.186  The court then applied the Penn Central factors and found that 
no unconstitutional taking had occurred.187  Thus, even in Michigan it 
seems that a fracking-takings claim would face an uphill battle. 
One prominent fracking-takings case is pending against the City of 
Dallas in Texas state court, but the case is complicated by the fact that 
the city leased the mineral rights before denying drilling permits to the 
company.188  A few other cases have raised, but not decided, the takings 
issue.  For example, a case in West Virginia included claims that denials 
of permits to drill amount to a taking, however, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court avoided deciding the takings question by holding that a 
state statute prohibiting drilling in state parks could not be applied 
retroactively where a deed conveying mineral interests beneath the state 
parks preceded the statutory prohibition.189  Similarly, in Pennsylvania, 
a case was decided where an oil and gas company alleged takings claims 
related to drilling in a state park, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
decided the case on other grounds.190  This case did make several 
passing references to takings law, although not necessary to the decision 
of the case.191  Additionally, in other mineral takings cases, the 
 185. Schmude Oil, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 856 N.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) 
(per curiam). 
 186. Id. at 93. 
 187. Id. at 94. 
 188. Trinity East Energy, LLC v City of Dallas, No. DC-14-1443, 2014 WL 631055 (Dallas Cty., 
Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 13, 2014) (trial was set for November 2, 2015, and summary judgment motions 
were due in August 2015).  Because the city leased the mineral rights, this case is not only a takings case 
but also involves allegations of fraud and breach of contract.  Samantha Blons, Dallas Takings Case 
Could Affect Future Mineral Development on Municipal Land, KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON CTR. FOR 
ENERGY, LAW & BUS. (Apr. 18, 2014), http://kbhenergycenter.utexas.edu/2014/04/18/dallas-takings-
case-could-affect-future-mineral-development-on-municipal-land/.   
 189. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Huffman, 705 S.E.2d 806, 814 (W. Va. 2010). 
 190. Belden & Blake Corp. v. Dep’t of Conserv. & Nat. Res., 969 A.2d 528, 532 (Pa. 2009) (this 
case involved the imposition bonds, fees, and right-of-way requirements).  The court decided the case on 
the grounds that even though the state owned the surface land, it did not have authority to require more 
than reasonable use of the surface when the oil and gas company was extracting the resources.  Id. at 
532-33. 
 191. The court did state that “a grant or reservation of minerals and the right to mine them 
constitute property rights, which the law recognizes, and which may not be taken for public use without 
compensation.”  Id. (citing Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).  The court did not 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that mineral rights are not 
to be analyzed alone in all cases, but, rather, under a flexible approach 
that considers all relevant factors, including reasonable investment-
backed expectations.192 
Although not a takings case, a court in Texas recently found that oil 
and gas operations near the Parr family’s residence in Texas amounted 
to a nuisance.  In the case, which involved a lot of time and expensive 
litigation, the jury found the oil and gas operator liable for $3 million in 
damages for causing a private nuisance.193  The same reasoning could be 
used in other jurisdictions to defend regulations or prohibitions on 
fracking from takings challenges.  The key issue then becomes an 
evidentiary issue in each particular case.  The Parr case does at least 
show, however, that fracking operations in the immediate vicinity of 
residential areas has been found to be a nuisance.  Although the 
government would bear the burden of establishing that nuisance law 
limits mineral interest owners’ right to extract their oil and gas, this case 
shows that it is possible for governments to meet that burden, at least in 
some instances.  The large and growing body of scientific literature 
documenting the risks associated with fracking would bolster these 
claims and support arguments from governments that they need not wait 
until their citizens are harmed to protect them from fracking.194 
Another background principle that might apply to fracking-takings is 
the reasonable use restriction regarding the use of the surface to extract 
subsurface minerals.195  For example, “an aggrieved surface owner may 
address any of the complexities for the denominator problem, nor did it discuss the Penn Central 
balancing factors or Lucas categorical takings.  Thus, not much can be predicted based on these passing 
and conclusory comments that compensation would be required.  As if the earlier statement were not 
overly broad enough, the opinion concluded with the following statement: “a property owner’s interests 
and rights cannot be lessened, nor their reasonable exercise impaired without just compensation, simply 
because a governmental agency with a statutory mandate comes to own the surface.”  Id. at 533.  This 
again is of course a borderline absurd misstatement of the law, which allows all kinds of lessening of 
property rights without requiring compensation, so long as the property right is not deprived of all 
economically beneficial use.  Furthermore, the latter part of the conclusion perhaps provides the key to 
understanding this decision – it was based not on a takings analysis but rather rested on the proposition 
that a surface owner cannot condition the extraction of minerals, even when the surface owner is the 
state.  That reading of this case would not be as blatantly inconsistent with Keystone, Penn Central, and 
numerous other takings precedents. 
 192. Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751 (Pa. 2002) (citing the test 
laid out by the Federal Circuit in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)).   
 193. Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. CC-11-1650-E (Dallas Cty. Tex. 2014).  The case focused 
on the toxic air emissions from the oil and gas operations and their effects on the neighboring Parr 
family.  Toxic air emissions are but one impact of fracking on neighbors and the public that might 
amount to a nuisance. 
 194. See discussion at supra notes 9-13, and accompanying text. 
 195. The court in Miller Bros. did not address this, but instead only focused on nuisance as the 
only possible background defense.  Miller Bros. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Mich. Ct. 
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bring a common law action in tort against an operator who has used the 
surface in an unreasonable manner.”196  “The right to use the surface as 
is reasonably necessary, known as the rule of reasonable surface use, 
does not include the right to destroy, interfere with or damage the 
surface owner’s correlative rights to the surface.”197  The right of 
reasonable surface use “does not create an ownership interest in the 
surface estate, or the right to destroy the surface, but merely a right of 
access.”198  Mineral interests may not be extracted in such a way that the 
surface rights are destroyed, even if destruction of the surface is the only 
practical means of extracting the minerals.199   
The central policy question raised by the background principles issue 
asks when it is appropriate for government to proactively limit or 
prohibit industrial activity that threatens the health, safety, and welfare 
of the public.  Must governments and their citizens wait for harm to 
occur and then seek compensation from the oil and gas industry, as 
happened in the Parr case?  Or can governments take preemptive action 
to protect their citizens by imposing limits on fracking, even if those 
limitations have significant economic effects?  Even if the harm already 
has occurred, proving harm due to fracking and related activities still 
can be costly, if not impossible, due to the latent nature of many of the 
harms200 as well as complex issues of causation related to different 
lifetime exposures to toxic chemicals.  Thus, the only approach which 
guarantees that the public health and welfare will not be harmed is 
allowing government to regulate or even prohibit fracking where it 
deems the risk to the public to be too great.  This approach is on 
especially sound footing when it is applied in densely populated urban 
and suburban communities where industrial activity has been found to 
be incompatible with competing land uses such as homes, schools, and 
parks.  Fracking has been proven to be a nuisance in some instances.  
App. 1994). 
 196. Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 926 (Colo. 1997).  The court further 
explained that “when a surface owner asserts a claim of trespass based on alleged excessive surface use, 
the trier of fact must consider whether the operator’s use of the surface was reasonable and necessary.”  
Id. 
 197. Id. (citing Colo. Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Salardino, 245 P.2d 461, 464 (Colo. 1952). 
 198. Notch Mountain Corp. v. Elliott, 898 P.2d 550, 556 (Colo. 1995). 
 199. Barker v. Mintz, 215 P. 534, 535 (Colo. 1923).  The court rejected claims that “the only 
practicable way to mine this coal is to strip off the soil and gravel lying upon it; that it cannot be 
practically mined by tunnel or shaft because there is no solid rock above it,” instead finding that the 
right to “use” the surface cannot mean to destroy it.  Id.   
 200. See Colborn et al., supra note 5.  (“The damage may not be evident at the time of exposure 
but can have unpredictable delayed, life-long effects on the individual and/or their offspring.  Effects of 
this nature would be much harder to identify than obvious impacts such as skin and eye irritation that 
occur immediately upon contact.  Health impairments could remain hidden for decades and span 
generations.”) 
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The impacts of fracking are becoming more and more clearly 
understood by the scientific community, as they already are understood 
by many residents where fracking takes place.  The noise, pollution, and 
annoyance that fracking inflicts upon its neighbors is more than 
sufficient to prevent a fracking-takings claim where government has 
acted to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. 
C. State- Specific Takings Law 
1. New York Takings Law 
Although New York courts have not yet addressed takings claims in 
connection with mineral rights, they have upheld a variety of laws 
directed at protecting public interests through protection of the 
environment.  For example, the courts found no unconstitutional taking 
based on requiring a conservation restriction in exchange for approval of 
development.201  Similarly, denial of variances from setback 
requirements under tidal wetlands permitting was not an 
unconstitutional taking.202  Courts in New York typically apply the 
familiar Penn Central test (a New York case, of course) to determine if 
a taking has occurred, sometimes finding an unconstitutional taking but 
often times not.203 
Regarding the critical issue of the scope of the property right to be 
analyzed, New York courts adhere to the “parcel as a whole” rule.204  
This rule has been applied in cases challenging regulations designed to 
protect the environment, such as the wetlands regulations.205  New York 
courts also have rejected a takings claim when rezoning a property as 
residential precluded the operation of a crushed-stone quarry on the 
property because the property still retained some economic value.206 
 201. Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1220-21 (N.Y. 2004). 
 202. Gazza v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1043 (N.Y. 2003). 
 203. See, e.g., Friedenburg v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451, 460 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2003) (finding a taking, under Penn Central factors, where a wetlands regulation destroyed 
“all but a bare residue of the economic value of the property.”). 
 204. See Putnam Cty. Nat. Bank v. City of New York, 829 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2007). 
 205. Spears v. Berle, 397 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (N.Y. 1979) (property owner wished to extract 
humus, sand, and stone from property subject to wetlands regulation); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., v. 
State, 479 N.Y.S.2d 983 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
 206. Briarcliff Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt, 708 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2000). 
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2. Colorado Takings Law 
Colorado has not yet issued any takings decisions in the oil and gas 
context.  However, takings claims in other contexts, particularly those 
involving mineral rights, as well as cases discussing background 
principles of law, are useful in predicting the outcome of fracking-
takings cases in Colorado.  These cases briefly will be presented to 
provide the final background necessary to analyze fracking-takings in 
our two case study jurisdictions. 
The first key issue is the scope of property rights that would be 
analyzed in a fracking-takings case in Colorado.  Like many other states, 
Colorado does recognize a severed mineral estate.207  However, when 
squarely presented with the issue, the Colorado Supreme Court has held 
that “the appropriate focus of a takings inquiry is the property rights as 
an aggregate rather than merely the mineral rights.”208  The same court 
also held that the denominator for assessing the economic impact of a 
regulation should be “the contiguous parcel of property owned by the 
landowner, not merely the segment most severely affected.”209  Earlier 
Colorado cases once could have been read to support a narrower 
reading, as they had recognized a taking of mineral rights, specifically 
coal, due to a requirement to provide support for a highway on the 
surface.210  However, that case was decided before the Supreme Court 
decision in Keystone which clarified that enforcing support requirements 
for coal do not necessarily create a taking.211  Furthermore, the question 
of considering separate mineral rights was not squarely presented, as it 
was in the more recent case discussed above.  Therefore, the current 
state of the law in Colorado is that courts are required to look at the full 
bundle of rights in land as part of a single contiguous property. 
One additional wrinkle to consider is that oil and gas have 
traditionally been treated differently from coal.  Specifically, Colorado 
courts have applied nuisance as a background principle defense against 
takings claims.  Most prominently, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected 
claims by the owner of a uranium-contaminated mill site alleging a total 
regulatory taking of its property by the Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment.212  The court held that “a property owner 
 207. Russell Coal Co. v Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder County, 270 P.2d 772, 774 (Colo. 1954). 
 208. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County of La Plata, 38 
P.3d 59, 68 (Colo. 2001).  The relevant mineral rights in this case which could be produced from the 
land were sand and gravel.  More broadly, the court stated that “it is inappropriate to limit a takings 
inquiry solely to one particular right in the land, or, to a particular part of the land.”  Id. at 61. 
 209. Id. at 68. 
 210. Russell Coal, 270 P.2d at 774.   
 211. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481 (1987). 
 212. Colo. Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1994).  Notably, this case was 
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[cannot] reasonably expect to put property to a use that constitutes a 
nuisance, even if that is the only economically viable use for the 
property.”213  And the issue of whether a nuisance had occurred 
expressly was held to be a “question of law” which could be resolved by 
the appellate courts,214 thus indicating that Colorado does not require a 
great deal of evidence to “prove” that an activity would constitute a 
nuisance.  The basic principles of nuisance law relied on in Colorado are 
that it applies to both activities and conditions, that a public nuisance is 
“the doing or failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, 
health, or morals of the public or works some substantial annoyance, 
inconvenience, or injury to the public,” and that uses of land that “cause 
pollution constitute a nuisance” under Colorado common law.215  The 
application of these broad nuisance principles to fracking-takings will be 
discussed more fully in Part III.A, infra. 
Finally, the Colorado constitution protects “inalienable rights” of its 
citizens.  This protection creates another background principle defense 
in fracking-takings cases in Colorado.  The Bill of Rights to the 
Colorado Constitution states that “[a]ll persons have certain natural, 
essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right 
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining their 
safety and happiness.”216  These rights were specifically cited in several 
of the local ballot measures to place moratoria or bans on fracking in 
local communities.217  Although the Colorado Supreme Court declined 
to reject a preemption claim in the Longmont case based on inalienable 
rights,218 the Court did not hold that inalienable rights have no meaning 
in Colorado, and thus they might still provide a background principle 
defense against a fracking-takings claim, even going beyond common 
law nuisance principles. 
One final aspect worth mentioning is that the takings clause in the 
Colorado constitution is somewhat broader than the federal takings 
clause, in that it protects against not just takings but also “damage” to 
private property.219  Thus, Colorado law protects “property owners who 
defended for the state by two prominent conservative lawyers, Gail Norton who was then the Attorney 
General (and later served as U.S. Secretary of the Interior) and Timothy Tymkovich, the State Solicitor 
General, who currently sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.   
 213. Id. at 1001.   
 214. Id. at 1002 n.7. 
 215. Id. at 1002. 
 216. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 217. See discussion at supra notes 38-41, and accompanying text. 
 218. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 585-86 (Colo. May 2, 2016). 
 219. “Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just 
compensation.”  COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15 (emphasis added).  Also worth noting is that the Colorado 
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have been substantially damaged by public improvements made upon 
land abutting their lands, but where no physical taking by the 
government has occurred.”220  However, outside of the situation where 
government action to create some public improvement damages private 
land, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted the state takings 
clause as consistent with the federal takings clause.221  Thus, both state 
and federal cases interpreting the Takings Clause would be relevant in 
deciding a fracking-takings claim brought in Colorado. 
IV. DOES REGULATION OF FRACKING CAUSE A TAKING OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY? 
A. Fracking and Background Principles 
Regardless of the bundle of rights held, a property owner does not 
have the right to take one of the sticks from the bundle and poke it in his 
neighbor’s eye.  While the owners of oil and gas mineral interests may 
sincerely believe that they have an absolute right to extract their 
property, no court has ever recognized such an absolute right.  Rather, as 
courts have repeatedly emphasized, the definition of property and 
property owners’ reasonable expectations include both the concept of 
limitations on property through background principles of law and 
property such as nuisance.  The metaphor often used is that “a nuisance 
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place – like a pig in the parlor 
instead of the barnyard.”  Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
takings do not occur when circumstances change such that previously 
lawful activity is deemed “injurious to the health, morals, or safety of 
the community,”222 or when the uses around the property preclude its 
use in a certain manner, such as for a brickyard,223 or when new 
circumstances arise giving the public interest priority over a private 
property interest, such as a disease spreading through trees.224  Fracking, 
constitution does not contain a public use requirement, however since one has been found in the federal 
takings clause, see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the difference is not material 
here. 
 220. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 388 (Colo. 2001) (citing City of Pueblo v. 
Strait, 36 P. 789, 791 (Colo. 1894).  The “damage” in this case was to landowners adjacent to an above-
ground electric power line.  Other cases applied the “damage” clause where the government constructed 
a viaduct next to plaintiff’s land, City of Pueblo, 36 P. 789, or made improvements to streets abutting 
private property that caused harm, Troiano v. Colo. Dep’t of Highways, 463 P.2d 448, 449 (Colo. 1969); 
Harrison v. Denver City Tramway Co., 131 P. 409 (Colo. 1913). 
 221. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the County of La Plata, 38 
P.3d 59, 64 (Colo. 2001). 
 222. Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887). 
 223. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
 224. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
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particularly when conducted in heavily populated areas, implicates 
many of these background principles. 
New York has made a strong showing that fracking amounts to a 
public nuisance at common law based on the report from the state 
Department of Health.  The nuisance-like impacts of fracking 
documented include air pollution, water pollution, induced earthquakes, 
community impacts of boom town economics, and health impacts such 
as increased cancer risk and premature births.225  These impacts would 
qualify as nuisance in New York as they are substantial harms that are 
unreasonable in nature, particularly in relation to fracking near 
residences and other highly populated areas.226   
Colorado nuisance law readily can be applied to fracking-takings 
claims.  In Colorado, a “public nuisance is the doing or failure to do 
something that injuriously affects the safety, health, or morals of the 
public or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to 
the public.”227  Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court has rejected a takings 
claim based on nuisance background principles because “relevant 
Colorado common law principles would not permit a landowner to 
engage in activities that spread radioactive contamination.”228  Colorado 
statutory nuisance law also would apply to fracking-takings cases.  The 
Colorado Public Nuisance statute prohibits “[a]ny unlawful pollution or 
contamination of any surface or subsurface waters in this state, or of the 
air” as well as “the conduct of persons in or about that place [] such as to 
annoy or disturb the peace of . . . the residents in the vicinity.”229  Ample 
evidence exists that fracking causes or may cause pollution of the air 
and water, and many unwilling neighbors to fracking sites can testify to 
how fracking “annoys or disturbs the peace” of their community.230  
 225. N.Y.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, A PUBLIC HEALTH REVIEW OF HIGH VOLUME HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING FOR SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 5-8 (2014). 
 226. Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 362 N.E. 2d 968, 972 (N.Y. 1977).  
A private nuisance under New York law threatens the use or enjoyment of land by one or relatively few 
people, while a public nuisance includes actions which “endanger or injure the property, health, safety 
or comfort of a considerable number of persons.”  Id. at 971.  
 227. Colo. Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994). 
 228. Id.  The court went on to explain that the property owner’s expectation that he would be able 
to use his property in a way that would spread contamination was “highly unreasonable.”  Id. 
 229. COLO. REV. STAT. 16-13-304(1)(a) and 16-13-305(1)(e) (1995). 
 230. One cautionary note that might limit the availability of the background principles defense 
based on nuisance is the hesitancy of courts to impose remedies such as injunctions to prevent an 
anticipatory nuisance.  For example, a decades-old Colorado Supreme Court case held that an injunction 
should not have issued to prevent the anticipatory nuisance of a quarry, particularly where the operation 
of the quarry was otherwise lawful and compatible with the area’s zoning regulations.  Green v. Castle 
Concrete Co., 509 P.2d 588, 591 (Colo. 1973).  However, this decision emphasized repeatedly that the 
court was deferring to the legislative judgment of the relevant government authorities, and that factor 
would weigh on the other side of the scale in a takings challenge, because the relevant legislature would 
have found a limitation on fracking to be necessary under the circumstances.  Still, the concept of 
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Allowing fracking, a large and disruptive industrial process, in the 
middle of residential or commercial zoned areas therefore would be 
prohibited under background principles of nuisance in Colorado.  There 
is no good justification for waiting for communities to suffer harm and 
then have to sue for damages, like the Parr family was forced to do in 
Texas. 
The Supreme Court essentially has treated the background principles 
argument as an affirmative defense, placing the burden on the 
government to prove that nuisance or other background principles 
prohibit the property owners’ use of his property under current 
circumstances.231  Although this requirement rejects a cautionary 
approach to protecting public health and welfare, governments often will 
be able to make the showings required under state nuisance law.  It is 
not a particularly heavy lift to show that fracking, and all of its 
associated processes, cause pollution, such as diesel exhaust from the 
heavy trucks, hazardous chemicals released at the wellhead, or the noise 
and light pollution associated with heavy industrial activity located in 
residentially-zoned areas, spills, and the risk of groundwater 
contamination.232  The poor safety record of the industry233 might 
provide sufficient evidence that fracking causes an unreasonable risk of 
harm to others, particularly where the fracking operations would be 
located near homes, schools, or businesses, as is often the case.234  
Evidence of difficulty selling property with nearby fracking operations 
or of people forced to move from their home to escape the noise, light, 
vibration, or pollution from fracking operations also likely would rise to 
the level of a “substantial annoyance, inconvenience, or injury to the 
public.”235  While it is certainly true that oil and gas extraction has not 
been considered a nuisance historically, times have changed.  When 
anticipatory nuisance highlights the burden that government would have to carry to show that nuisance 
law would impose limits on the ability of the oil and gas industry to conduct fracking operations.  For a 
more detailed discussion of anticipatory nuisance, see George P. Smith, II, Re-Validating the Doctrine 
of Anticipatory Nuisance, 29 VT. L. REV. 687 (2005) (noting judicial hesitancy to restrain conduct 
before its effects are known). 
 231. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). 
 232. See, e.g., Wilmore v. Chain O’Mines, 44 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Colo. 1934) (property owner has 
no right to pollute a stream). 
 233. An exhaustive accounting of the industry’s safety record is beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, one of the oil and gas operators in Longmont, TOP Operating, had such a poor safety record 
that it prompted citizens to band together to ban fracking in the community.  Leaks at TOP Operating’s 
wells and waste pits have been known since 2006.  See Longmont looks at drilling suggestions, 
LONGMONT TIMES-CALL, http://www.timescall.com/ci_20411471/longmont-oil-gas-drilling-suggestions 
(last visited May 25, 2016). 
 234. Moore v. Standard Paint & Glass, 358 P.2d 33, 36 (Colo. 1960) (holding that nuisance law 
applies both to conditions and activities on private property which create unreasonable risk of harm to 
others). 
 235. Colo. Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994). 
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courts are presented with evidence on the full range of impacts 
associated with fracking, the risk of harm, pollution, and annoyance 
caused by modern industry practices stand a good chance of being 
deemed a nuisance.  The likelihood of finding a nuisance increases in 
densely populated areas or residentially zoned areas where industrial 
activity is out of place and incongruous with the neighboring land uses 
such as homes and schools.  Although a nuisance defense would be by 
no means a slam dunk, the realities of modern fracking practices and the 
severe disturbance and impacts they impose on neighbors in otherwise 
tranquil areas at least make this a viable defense that could gain traction 
in court. 
Going beyond nuisance law, reasonable use is another background 
principle that might insulate fracking regulations and bans from takings 
claims in New York and Colorado.  This principle applies most directly 
to impacts on the surface property, unlike nuisance which focuses more 
on the neighboring properties.  However, because of the use of 
horizontal drilling in fracking cases, which now means that the oil and 
gas being extracted may lie under property far from the wellsite, a 
broader application of the principle may be justified.  Reasonable use is 
a limitation under New York law where courts have found mineral 
rights do not include the right to take unreasonable actions or actions not 
necessary to the production of underlying minerals.236  In Colorado, the 
law protects surface property owners from mineral owners who use the 
surface in an unreasonable manner, and the right of reasonable surface 
use “does not include the right to destroy, interfere with or damage the 
surface owner’s correlative rights to the surface.”237  If the only means 
for extracting the minerals requires unreasonable interference with 
surface rights, then the mineral owner effectively has no right to extract 
the minerals.238  Governments have many factual arguments that large 
scale fracking operations, and all of their associated activities, amount to 
an unreasonable use of the surface due to their large footprint, pollution 
and safety risks at the surface, and the interference with the rights of 
surface owners by reducing their property value or limiting their ability 
to sell their property. 
Additionally, the public trust doctrine is an inherent aspect of 
sovereignty, including state sovereignty, which imposes a trust 
 236. Miles v. Home Gas Co., 316 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (disallowing right to 
store gas from foreign fields on surface property); see also Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co., 55 N.Y. 
538 (N.Y. 1874); Frank v. Fortuna Energy, Inc., 856 N.Y.S.2d 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (discussing 
reasonable use for oil and gas interest). 
 237. Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 926 (Colo. 1997); see also Notch 
Mountain Corp. v. Elliott, 898 P.2d 550, 556 (Colo. 1995); Barker v. Mintz, 215 P. 534, 535 (Colo. 
1923).   
 238. Barker, 215 P. at 535. 
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responsibility for certain critical natural resources on behalf of the 
public, and, as such, this constitutes a background principle that can 
defend against fracking-takings claims.239  The public trust doctrine has 
deep historical origins and has been recognized in U.S. law since at least 
1892.240  Initially applied to tidal or navigable waters, the public trust 
doctrine has been expanded to other water resources such as wetlands 
and groundwater as well as non-water resources such as parks, forests, 
wildlife, and ecosystems.241  Sovereign governments, including New 
York and Colorado, have obligations to protect these public trust 
resources.  To the extent that fracking harms those resources, the public 
trust doctrine acts as a background principle defense for any regulation 
or prohibition on fracking designed to prevent that harm. 
New York has taken a relatively broad approach to the public trust 
doctrine, recognizing that it applies to public park land242 as well as the 
more traditional application to navigable waters.243  The public trust 
doctrine even has been discussed in a takings case in New York based 
on a challenge to the Long Island Pine Barrens Protection Act, part of 
the state Environmental Conservation Law.244  The takings claim was 
rejected, even though it limited development on Long Island, based on 
the justification that a law designed to conserve drinking water did not 
amount to a taking because it merely gave expression to the public trust 
doctrine.245  Although Colorado courts have not expressly applied the 
public trust doctrine in any of their cases,246 Colorado was admitted to 
 239. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 U. MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
 240. Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (finding that public trust 
responsibilities over navigable waters and the lands beneath them prevented the state from selling 
submerged lands to a private interest). 
 241. See Kevin J. Lynch, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Modern Fisheries 
Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 292-93 (2007). 
 242. Capruso v. Vill. of Kings Point, 16 N.E.3d 527, 530 (N.Y. 2014); see also Williams v. 
Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121 (N.Y. 1920) (prohibiting the commissioner of parks from allowing portion of 
Central Park to be used for non-park purposes). 
 243. See, e.g., Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 615 N.Y.S. 788, 792 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1994), aff’d, 706 N.E.2d 1192 (N.Y. 1998). 
 244. W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (discussing law 
designed to protect drinking water). 
 245. “This generation’s duty has been discharged merely by setting aside this land for their use 
under the doctrine of the Public Trust.”  Id. at 1012.  The court created a broad application of the 
background principles defense when it stated “conservation laws need no specific scientific justification 
and admit no rebuttal on the basis of utility.  In enacting environmental mandates (as in protecting the 
right of property), we are merely discharging our obligation under the societal contract” between 
generations.  Id.  
 246. Most cases involving the public trust doctrine in Colorado revolve around attempts by voters 
to require stricter adherence to the public trust doctrine through ballot measures.  See, e.g., In re Title, 
Ballot Title, Submission Clause for 2011-2012 No. 3, 274 P.3d 562 (Colo. 2012).  In cases making 
substantive claims regarding the public trust doctrine, the Colorado courts have declined to reach the 
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the Union “on an equal footing with the original states” and, therefore, 
has the same sovereign rights and responsibilities over public trust 
resources as other states.247  While Colorado has some latitude in 
defining the scope of the public trust doctrine it will apply, it cannot 
completely abdicate its public trust responsibilities.248  Thus, the public 
trust doctrine must be viewed as a potential limitation on mineral 
owners’ property rights in both New York and Colorado. 
Finally, both the Colorado constitution and state statutes authorize 
regulations that are designed to protect public health, safety, and 
welfare.249  The inalienable rights provision of the Colorado constitution 
creates a background principle that affirmatively authorizes all citizens, 
including when acting through their government, to protect their “right 
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining their 
safety and happiness.”250  The owners of mineral rights do not have a 
property interest in extracting their oil and gas in a manner that threatens 
those inalienable rights like fracking threatens to do.  Additionally, the 
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act requires that the state ensure 
that production of oil and gas is “consistent with protection of public 
health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and 
wildlife resources.”251  This state statute embodies several background 
principles such as nuisance, reasonable use, inalienable rights, and the 
police power of government as a valid pre-existing limitation on mineral 
merits.  See City of Steamboat Springs v. Johnson, 252 P.3d 1142, 1148 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010) (case 
involved construction of a highway on greenbelt area and claim that public trust required dedication of 
additional open space to replace the lost greenbelt land); Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. 
Water Cons. Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (finding that state 
agency, in complying with relevant statutory provision, had “satisfied whatever public trust 
responsibilities it may have”). 
 247. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1894). 
 248. See, e.g., Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill., 146 U.S. 387, 460-61 (1892). 
 249. Colorado courts have said remarkably little on the status of the public trust doctrine in that 
state.  The court has acknowledged that the public trust has been used in other contexts, but failed to 
explain why it does not apply to the specific case before it.  See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 
1027-28 (Colo. 1979) (basing the decision on a narrow reading of a state constitutional provision setting 
up the prior appropriate system for water rights).  The public trust doctrine has been criticized in a few 
dissents from the Colorado Supreme Court as well.  See, e.g., Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. 
Colo. Water Conserv. Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting); In re Title, 
Ballot Title, Submissions Clause for 2011-2012 No. 3, 274 P.3d 562, 572-74 (Colo. 2012).  Most of the 
cases in Colorado discussing the public trust doctrine deal with attempts to amend the state constitution 
by explicitly defining the scope of the public trust doctrine as it applies to water in Colorado, rather than 
cases where the court discusses the meaning of existence of the public trust doctrine directly.  Thus, it is 
not correct to state that the public trust doctrine does not exist in Colorado.  Rather, the courts in 
Colorado simply have not applied the public trust doctrine substantively to any cases or taken any 
opportunity to define its scope, particularly as it might apply to resources other than water. 
 250. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 251. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I) (2014). 
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estates such as oil and gas. 
B. Defining the Scope of the Property Right for a Total Take 
If courts determine that no background principles would support the 
regulation being challenged, the next step in a takings analysis would be 
to define the scope of the property analyzed.  Based on the guidance 
provided by the Supreme Court, the industry claimant would seek to 
argue for a narrow scope, limited to only mineral rights or to an oil and 
gas lease, perhaps.  In contrast, government defendants would argue that 
the full scope of property, up to a fee simple interest in land, should be 
the relevant property interest based on the “parcel as a whole” rule.  The 
outcome would depend on the specific facts of each case, state property 
law, and how willing the particular court is to find a taking. 
The most defensible definition for the scope of the property right is a 
fee simple estate in land.  If this approach is adopted, then proving the 
occurrence of a total take would be nearly impossible.  The surface 
likely would retain at least some value, even if oil and gas development 
was prohibited.  This is particularly the case in cities and towns in New 
York and Colorado, where much of the proposed development would be 
beneath existing uses on the surface such as homes, schools, parks, etc.  
Many Supreme Court cases support this approach, based on the parcel as 
a whole rule.252  No Supreme Court case after Lucas has applied the 
total take rule to anything less than a fee simple interest in land. 
After a fee simple in the land as a whole, a severed mineral estate is 
the property that has the most likely chance of being recognized as the 
appropriate basis for takings purposes.  This argument is unlikely to 
succeed where the surface estate and the mineral estate both have the 
same owner,253 but may have some chance of success if the mineral 
estate is owned separately from the surface.  This is often the case in 
many states, including New York and Colorado.  However, even if the 
only focus is on the mineral estate, it still will be difficult to prove that a 
total take has occurred.  A fracking ban would affect only oil and gas, so 
any value in the mineral estate in coal, sand and gravel, or other 
minerals would defeat a total takings claim.   
Even if oil and gas are the only minerals that have economic value in 
a particular parcel, a total take claim still faces several obstacles.  First, 
oil and gas previously may have been produced from the parcel using 
 252. Most notably, the Supreme Court rejected attempts to break apart the bundle of rights in a fee 
simple interest in land, particularly with regard to air development rights, which are analogous to 
mineral rights.  Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 125, 130 (1978). 
 253. See, e.g., District Intown Prop. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 880 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (giving limited value to subdivision of property where all lots held by the same owner). 
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traditional drilling and completion techniques, or perhaps fracking 
itself.254  This historical production would preclude a total take.255  
Second, it may be possible to produce oil and gas without using 
fracking.  Even if this would result in less oil and gas being produced, 
and thus less profit to industry, it nevertheless would defeat a total 
takings claim.  Third, even if no oil and gas could be economically 
produced without using fracking, the mineral estate may still have some 
remaining value.  Circumstances often change in the industry.  Not only 
might a ban on fracking be lifted if politics change, or if the impacts of 
fracking can be reduced enough to be deemed “safe” by the government, 
but new technologies might come along that would allow the resource to 
be produced without using fracking.256  Thus, assertions that the value of 
the mineral estate is zero without the ability to frack should be treated 
with skepticism by the court.257  Finally, the claimant must be able to 
prove that he or she actually would produce the oil and gas in the 
absence of a fracking ban.  This must be more than a mere assertion, 
particularly given the rapidly evolving technological and economic 
conditions.  When oil and gas prices were riding high, it would have 
been much easier for takings plaintiffs to prove that they actually could 
produce oil and gas at a profit.  At currently low prices for both oil and 
gas, these claims are much less credible.258 
 254. Recent news reports have indicated at least some examples of oil and gas companies that are 
currently operating producing wells in New York from a formation other than the Marcellus Shale, 
which would preclude a total take finding even if only the mineral estate was examined.  See Anya 
Litvak, Uncommon Legal Concept May Surface in New York After Fracking Ban, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Dec. 23, 2014, 1:00 AM), http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/policy-
powersource/2014/12/23/Uncommon-legal-concept-may-surface-in-New-York-after-fracking-
ban/stories/201412230015 (discussing how Talisman Energy has 70 wells producing from a limestone 
formation below the Marcellus Shale). 
 255. Historical production would most clearly preclude a total take where ownership of the 
property had not changed.  However, it may be tempting to think that if historical production predated 
the current owner’s interest in the mineral estate, then a total take might still be allowed.  This reasoning 
should be rejected by courts, because it would create an untenable and unfair system where a longtime 
owner cannot bring a takings claim but a new owner could.  This would invite mineral interest owners to 
game the system by simply selling the mineral estate to a new owner in order to bring a takings claim 
based on a total take categorical claim.  Public liability for takings claims should not be subject to the 
whims of such gamesmanship. 
 256. Although flawed in many ways, the Michigan Court of Appeals decision in Miller Bros. did 
at least recognize the temporary nature of restrictions on oil and gas development, because the oil and 
gas remains in place so that it may be extracted in the future if the ban is lifted, for example.  See Miller 
Bros. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 N.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). 
 257. The Supreme Court had recognized a reduction of over 93% as not amounting to a total take.  
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001).  It is not difficult to imagine that someone 
might be willing to purchase mineral rights at 7% of their value in order to have the option of producing 
if the law changes to allow fracking, or the technology allows production without fracking. 
 258. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK 29 tbl.2 (Mar. 10, 
2015) (projecting average price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil to be $52.15 for 2015, compared 
to $93.26 in 2014, for a decline of 44 percent).  Of course, oil and gas prices may well go up again in the 
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Colorado law on takings of mineral interests, like federal law, is 
mixed.  The Colorado courts have not addressed takings in the oil and 
gas context, but they have for other mineral interests such as sand and 
gravel or coal.  In a sand and gravel takings case, the Colorado Supreme 
Court affirmed the “parcel as a whole” rule, holding that “the 
appropriate focus of a takings inquiry is the property rights as an 
aggregate rather than merely the mineral rights.”259  The court explicitly 
discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Penn Central and 
Keystone which rejected attempts to conceptually sever the airspace 
development rights and the support estate in coal respectively.260  Thus 
Colorado has rejected the severed estate approach suggested by states 
such as Ohio.261  A regulatory taking might still be found when 
analyzing the effect of fracking regulations on the parcel as a whole, but 
not a Lucas total.262 
Coal takings cases in Colorado should not be read to support 
choosing the oil and gas estate or the mineral estate as the denominator 
for the total takings test.  First, any Colorado cases finding a taking of 
coal interests are over half a century old,263 much less recent than the 
Animas Valley Sand & Gravel decision in 2001 which squarely ruled on 
this question.  Second, the only coal takings case which came after 
Lucas was decided actually found no unconstitutional taking, whether 
total or otherwise.264  While coal takings cases are interesting because 
future.  But they may also go down.  Reliance on “economics” as a factor in the takings analysis is 
called into question by the oil and gas example, due to the wild fluctuations in a market driven largely 
by speculation.  But even assuming that reliance on economics is good policy, the economics of fracking 
in many areas are not good currently.  The weekly rig count in the United States has been dropping 
precipitously in recent months, indicating declining interest in drilling new oil and gas wells.  See, e.g., 
Angela Chen, U.S. Rig Count Falls to 922 in Latest Week, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2015, 1:33 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-rig-count-falls-to-922-in-latest-week-1425666810 (noting the thirteenth 
straight week of declines, with the number of all oil and gas rigs at 1,192, down from 1,792 a year ago).  
Additionally, industry reports indicate that many wells which have been drilled have not been 
completed, i.e. fracked, because it would not be profitable to do so with oil and gas prices so low.  Dan 
Murtaugh & Lynn Dolan, Introducing Fracklog, the New-Fangled Oil Storage System: Energy, WASH. 
POST/BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 6, 2015, 2:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-
06/introducing-fracklog-the-new-fangled-oil-storage-system-energy (citing Continental Resources CEO 
as saying 85% of wells are not being completed currently).  Additionally, the breakeven price for many 
areas is near or even above current prices.  FACTBOX-Breakeven Oil Prices for U.S. Shale: Analyst 
Estimates, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2014) (noting many areas where the breakeven price for oil is above the 
current oil price of around $50/bbl; estimates for the Niobrara, which includes the areas in the Colorado 
case study, range from $46.10-$72.75). 
 259. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. La Plata County, 38 P.3d 59, 68 (Colo. 2001).   
 260. Id. 
 261. See State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 875 N.E.2d 59, 67 
(Ohio 2007). 
 262. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, 38 P.3d at 65 (noting that a regulatory taking might be proven 
under a fact-specific inquiry even if a total take was not established). 
 263. See, e.g., William E. Russell Coal Co. v. Boulder Cty., 270 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1954). 
 264. City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 181-82 (Colo. 1993) (noting that severance of 
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they also involve mineral interests, they are also readily distinguishable, 
because any cases that found a taking have relied on a permanent 
requirement to leave coal in place in order to support the surface, which 
is different from regulations or prohibitions on fracking based on the 
adverse public health, safety, and environmental impacts associated with 
that particular technology.265 
One final policy issue is relevant regarding the scope of the property 
for fracking-takings in Colorado based on the current legal disputes over 
fracking bans.  In order for a taking to be found based on a fracking ban, 
Colorado courts (specifically the Colorado Supreme Court) first would 
have to find that local bans on fracking are not preempted by state law.  
Only then would a takings claim even arise.266  Yet a decision which 
does not involve preemption of local regulations would lay the 
groundwork for a finding of no unconstitutional taking. A finding of no 
preemption likely would be based on one of two findings:  (1) fracking 
is a matter of local concern, because the impacts fracking has on the 
local community outweighs any state interest in promoting oil and gas 
development; or (2) regulation including a ban on fracking is consistent 
with the state interest which in turn requires oil and gas development to 
be consistent with protection of public health and the environment.  
Thus, it is difficult to imagine the Colorado Supreme Court finding an 
unconstitutional taking had occurred after first ruling that state law does 
not preempt a ban.  Essentially, a local fracking ban likely only survives 
if the courts recognize that fracking creates a nuisance in local 
communities.  Thus, the prospect for takings claims in Colorado is 
particularly dim, given the context of its bans and the nature of state 
preemption law.   
So what is the takeaway then regarding the scope of the property 
right?  In large part this is unknown, particularly in New York and 
Colorado, as the issue has not yet been squarely presented.  However, 
for basically every plausible fact pattern, it would be difficult, if not 
the mineral estate included a duty to support the surface and rejecting a physical occupation claim based 
on a “single, transitory physical invasion” through drilling of a test well).  The court further rejected a 
claim that information from the test well which showed that coal mining on the subject property was not 
commercially feasible.  Id. at 184. 
 265. The effect of the more permanent requirements for coal to support the surface estate are 
discussed more fully at infra Part IV.D. 
 266. There is a possibility of a “temporary takings” claim based on the time between when a ban 
was enacted and when it might be invalidated as preempted.  However, such a claim is unlikely, as for 
the most part industry has not demonstrated that it would actually be fracking in the particular 
jurisdictions with bans currently.  In fact, in Longmont the principal operator has agreed not to bring any 
takings claims until after the preemption issue is decided.  Complaint of Intervenor TOP Operating 
Company ¶ 15, June 21, 2013, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63, (Boulder 
Cty. Colo.) (“TOP has agreed not to assert, either directly or indirectly (through another party), any 
takings claim or claim for damages against Longmont in this action.”). 
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impossible, to prove that a total take had occurred.  First, a finding of a 
total take would require a very narrow interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent that would focus on a narrowly defined mineral estate.  
Second, the claimant would have to prove at least the following facts: 
(1) no oil and gas had been produced previously from that mineral 
estate; (2) no oil and gas could be produced in the future without the use 
of fracking; (3) oil and gas could be produced, under current economic 
and technical conditions, using fracking; and (4) the remaining value of 
the mineral estate, with a fracking ban in place, was zero.  This 
appropriately has been described as an uphill battle and one that is 
unlikely to succeed. 
C. Regulation of Fracking under the Penn Central Factors 
The most likely test to be applied in a fracking-takings case—
assuming no background principle defense was shown—would be the 
familiar Penn Central balancing test.  As this is a highly fact-specific 
test and the ultimate outcome of any weighing by courts is largely 
indeterminate, this Article will not attempt to predict with any certainty 
how cases would come out under this test.  However, a few general 
observations again indicate the difficulty that a claimant would face 
under this approach. 
The character of the government action likely would weigh strongly 
against finding a taking.  A prohibition on fracking does not physically 
invade any private property.  Rather, it is aimed at securing the common 
good by preventing the externalities associated with extracting oil and 
gas through the use of fracking.  This factor recognizes that the 
government has a role in protecting the public health.  In the face of any 
uncertainty about whether fracking is consistent with the protection of 
public health and welfare, courts should be extremely hesitant to 
overrule the decisions of legislative bodies.  Where those legislative 
bodies have concluded that the public should not have to bear even the 
uncertainty of risks, it is appropriate for courts to defer to this 
conclusion unless it can be shown by a fracking-takings claimant that 
the government’s action is clearly erroneous. 
In New York, the state has gone to extraordinary lengths to document 
the uncertainty surrounding fracking and whether it can be done safely.  
Because fracking poses a serious risk to the common good, the character 
of the government action strongly supports a finding of no taking.  In 
contrast to the nuisance background principle defense, here the 
government need not prove fracking constitutes a nuisance, but rather 
that a prohibition on fracking is necessary to support the common 
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good.267  Because the harms of fracking are concentrated greatly on the 
areas in the immediate vicinity of fracking operations, and the benefits 
often flow to distant oil and gas companies, the market cannot be relied 
upon to reduce these externalities and, thus, government regulation is 
necessary and appropriate.   
In Colorado, where fracking bans or regulations are relatively limited 
in geographic scope and focused on relatively dense urban and suburban 
areas, the character of the government action would support regulation 
to reduce or limit those harms.  The local laws in Colorado should be 
seen as valid exercises of zoning authority268 or as necessary actions by 
government to protect the inalienable rights of all citizens to protect 
their lives, liberty, safety, and their own property rights.269  Thus, the 
character of the government action, designed at protecting broad public 
interests and preventing harm, should weigh heavily against a taking in 
most, if not all, fracking-takings cases. 
The economic impact of the regulation largely would depend upon 
the resolution of the denominator problem, discussed more fully in the 
previous section.  This factor could range from minimal impact to a very 
significant impact, depending on the unique facts and circumstances of 
each case.  However, where the diminution in value is less than 100%, 
even very large impacts of regulations have been found not to amount to 
an unconstitutional taking under the Penn Central factors.270  Thus, even 
if this factor supports finding an unconstitutional taking, it is far from 
conclusive. 
The final factor, interference with distinct investment-backed 
expectations, also would be highly fact-specific, thus making 
conclusions difficult to draw from this analysis.  However, one issue for 
claimants to overcome would be the likelihood that the profits made 
from fracking largely would be a windfall, particularly if they have held 
ownership of the mineral interests for more than a decade or so.  Before 
the development of modern fracking techniques along with horizontal 
drilling, the resources being extracted today were seen as “not 
recoverable” and of limited to no value.  For most oil and gas 
companies, mineral interest owners, or royalty owners, these 
 267. The Penn Central balancing factors are only reached if the government could not prove that 
the regulation merely prevented activity which would be deemed a public nuisance.  Thus, the character 
of government action may still support a finding of no taking even if the government cannot prove that 
fracking would be a nuisance.  Courts have been repeatedly instructed to look at the totality of 
circumstances under the Penn Central test, including specifically the public purposes served by the 
regulation in question.  Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606, 633-34 (2001). 
 268. Particularly if local regulations or bans are not preempted under state law. 
 269. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 270. See, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630-31 (finding that $200,000 remaining value out of a total 
value of $3,150,000, for a take of over 93%). 
 
2016] FRACKING/TAKINGS 91 
developments were not due to their own investments.  Rather, these 
changes converted previously worthless mineral interests into ones that 
could make tremendous windfall profits if companies and owners are 
allowed to frack wherever they please.  Absent a showing that a 
fracking-takings plaintiff has reasonably invested significant amounts of 
capital in the expectation it could utilize fracking, this factor is unlikely 
to support a takings claim. 
D. Temporary Restrictions on Fracking: The Case of Moratoria 
If an outright ban on fracking found in New York state or some local 
jurisdictions in Colorado is unlikely to be found to constitute an 
unconstitutional taking, then a moratorium on fracking designed to give 
government officials a chance to catch up to the rapid pace of change in 
the oil and gas industry is even less likely to be found a taking.  All of 
the same reasons why a ban would not be a taking apply in this 
situation—already a very difficult hill for fracking-takings plaintiffs to 
climb.  Additional arguments against temporary takings will make 
takings claims based on moratoria nearly impossible. 
A good example of a moratorium is the one enacted through a ballot 
measure by the citizens of Fort Collins, Colorado.  Concerned that their 
city council was not responding to the will of the voters, a group of 
community members organized to place a five year moratorium on the 
ballot, and this moratorium was approved at the ballot box in November 
2013.271  The stated purpose of the moratorium was to “protect property, 
property values, public health, safety and welfare” while providing time 
for the city “to study the impacts of the process [of fracking] on the 
citizens of the City of Fort Collins.”272  This express purpose fits well 
with the Supreme Court’s reasoning for rejecting a taking in the Tahoe-
Sierra case, because the additional time allows city regulators to study 
the impacts and devise an appropriate regulatory response, thus 
“facilitating informed decisionmaking” by the city.273 
Although the length of the moratorium in Fort Collins is longer than 
the moratorium at issue in Tahoe-Sierra, there is no bright line rule for 
when a moratorium lasts too long.  Instead, courts must ask whether the 
moratorium amounts to an “extraordinary delay in governmental 
 271. See City of Fort Collins, Special Election held in conjunction with the Larimer County 
General Election (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.fcgov.com/cityclerk/elections2013nov.php (the 
moratorium was adopted with 57% in favor). 
 272. Proposed Citizen Ordinance, Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.fcgov.com/cityclerk/ballotlangfull-
2013nov.php. 
 273. Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 339 (2002). 
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decisionmaking.”274  In the case of Fort Collins, there is a strong 
argument from the city that the delay was reasonable under the 
circumstances and necessary based on pending studies, the results of 
which were expected to become available during the course of the 
moratorium.  Specifically, the ballot measure through which the 
moratorium was adopted explicitly refers to a health impact assessment 
expected to be conducted by the State of Colorado.275  Additionally, 
proponents of the moratorium cited to additional studies to explain why 
they chose a five year moratorium period.276  These facts should be 
more than sufficient to preclude a takings claim based on this five year 
moratorium, especially since courts have declined to find an 
unconstitutional taking based on even longer delays of up to seven to 
eight years.277   
E. Valuation of Any Takings Found 
Even assuming that a takings could be proven, and no affirmative 
defense is available, the tricky question of valuation remains.  Fracking-
takings present several difficult questions with no simple answers.  
Unlike a fee simple interest in land, which has a reasonably clear market 
value, mineral interests are highly speculative.  Often the value of the 
interest is not known until the oil and gas actually is produced and sold.  
Additionally, because the value in mineral interests is not in owning or 
using them, but, rather, in producing and selling the resource, the 
property interest is in many ways more akin to personal property than to 
real property.  Yet the minerals are not actually taken—they remain 
under ground to be potentially produced at some time in the future.  
Finally, the oil and gas industry is a notoriously boom and bust industry, 
not just because of the quick declines in production, but also due to large 
and unpredictable swings in the market price for the resource.  As a 
result of all of these factors, court valuation of fracking-takings claims is 
tremendously difficult. 
One thing can be said with relative confidence, however: the 
valuation of a takings claim should not be based on lost profits, despite 
the industry’s common assertion.278  Even the one questionable decision 
 274. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v.  United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 275. Proposed Citizen Ordinance, supra note 272. 
 276. Aff. of Elizabeth Giddens, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Fort Collins, No 2013CV31385 
(Larimer Cty. Colo.) (citing studies by the National Science Foundation and Environmental Protection 
Agency as well as the state, expected to be released between 2016 and 2019).  
 277. See, e.g., Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 472 
U.S. 172 (1985) (delay of eight years); Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (delay of 
seven years). 
 278. See, e.g., TOP Operating Company’s Amended Response to Citizen Intervenors’ Motion for 
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which found a taking in the oil and gas context did not agree that this 
valuation was appropriate.279  The production of oil and gas is a risky 
business.  Sometimes wells do not produce oil and gas or do not produce 
the quantities expected.  It is not uncommon for operators to lose money 
on individual wells.  Paying the value of the presumed resource or for 
speculative “lost profits” would take all of the risk away and create a 
windfall for the claimant at the expense of the public.   
Another reason to avoid paying for the value of the resource or for 
lost profits is that the government is not actually taking the oil and gas.  
Governments have not condemned mineral rights or oil and gas interests 
and, therefore, unless the court finds a permanent taking occurred and 
transfers the taken property interest to the government, the owner still 
retains the right to extract the minerals if the regulations change to allow 
fracking or if a new technique comes along that allows production 
without fracking.  Oil and gas prices might also go up so much in the 
future that alternate means to produce oil and gas, which are not 
economical under today’s standards, could allow mineral rights owners 
to extract value from their resource even if existing regulations and bans 
remain in place. 
The dramatic swings in the price of oil and gas raise an additional 
issue.  Even if fracking could be proven to be the only means of 
producing oil and gas from a particular mineral estate, delays in 
producing the resource actually might work to the advantage of the 
mineral interest owner.  This would be relevant for any “temporary 
takings” claims that might occur, particularly as the price of oil and gas 
have dropped dramatically in recent months.  If the price rebounds in the 
future, it may be that the restrictions on fracking either had no economic 
impact or could lead to increased profits for claimants who weren’t 
producing during periods of low prices.  If the price declines for an 
extended period of time, then many fracking-takings plaintiffs may not 
even be able to show that their mineral interests have any value.   
These considerations call into question whether recognition of a 
taking is even appropriate.  Let us imagine a hypothetical world where 
the price of oil drops to $20/bbl and remains there for an extended 
period of time.  This price for oil would preclude most if not all 
potential takings claims related to fracking bans or regulations.  Yet if 
Stay Pending Appeal at 3, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty., 
filed Oct. 2, 2014) (arguing based on an apparent back of the envelope calculation that it could make 
over $215M by drilling 13 wells in Longmont immediately, and therefore that a bond of nearly $20M 
should be posted to stay judgment while an appeal could be pursued)  The court rejected this argument, 
and set a bond of $100, which was 0.0005% of the requested $20M.  Order: Reply in Support of Stay 
Pending Appeal, Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 2013CV63 (Boulder Cty. Oct. 14, 
2014). 
 279. Miller Bros. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 513 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).  
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the price ten years from now increases to $150/bbl, perhaps due to 
disruptions in supply in unstable regions like the Middle East or Nigeria, 
could a takings claim be brought at that time?  Why should the 
determination of an unconstitutional taking be so dependent on issues 
utterly outside the control of state or local governments?  Might 
governments then have an incentive to restrict fracking when the price 
of oil and gas is low in order to protect against the harms of fracking on 
their communities, yet if the price of oil and gas rises, they should then 
decide that protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the community 
is not worth potentially crippling takings judgments against them?280  Or 
instead does takings law provide the same incentives to governments to 
game the system as it would to mineral interest owners?  Should 
governments—now that they know new resources are recoverable but 
only in ways that greatly upset their communities—initiate eminent 
domain proceedings to formally take mineral interests when the prices 
are low, because they cannot be extracted economically at that time?  
Surely the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not intended to 
create such perverse incentives. 
A simple example, based on realistic numbers for the price of oil and 
the cost of producing it, is helpful to understand the dramatic change 
that can occur in very short timeframes.  Let us assume that an oil and 
gas development project has the potential to produce 200,000 barrels of 
oil (gas excluded for simplicity).  Assume further that the cost to 
produce that oil amounts to $45/bbl,281 or $9,000,000.  Let us assume 
the price for oil goes from $95/bbl to $50/bbl.282  Assuming all the oil 
was produced in a year, a company could invest $9 million to make a 
$10 million profit at $95/bbl, but would only make $1 million profit on 
the investment of $9 million at $50/bbl.  Thus, a potential takings claim 
based on the value of lost profits could vary by an order of magnitude if 
a fracking-takings case was filed in 2014 instead of 2015.  Thus, any 
just compensation awards that are based on estimated value of the oil 
and gas are highly arbitrary. 
No court has yet announced a consistent and justifiable system for 
putting a valuation on a takings claim in the oil and gas context.  In the 
only case to actually find a taking, the Michigan Court of Appeals 
reversed the lower court on the valuation issue.283  The court held that 
 280. For a critique of putting a dollar value on human life and health, see generally Liza 
Heinzerling & Frack Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental 
Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002). 
 281. See supra note 258, explaining that breakeven costs for the Niobrara shale, which includes 
the Wattenberg field beneath Longmont, Colorado, range from $46.10-$72.75. 
 282. See id., discussing how EIA predicts oil prices to average barely above $50/bbl in 2015, after 
averaging over $90/bbl in 2014. 
 283. Miller Bros., 513 N.W.2d  at 221. 
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an award of $71,479,000—determined to be the fair market value of the 
property found to be taken—should not have been equated with the just 
compensation that was owed.284  After walking through some of the 
difficulties in determining the market value in this type of case,285 the 
court instead proposed that just compensation should be based instead 
on the “fair market rental value.”286  The court found that the rental 
value, rather than the cash value of the entire mineral interest at that 
time, was the appropriate measure, because the plaintiffs were not 
“permanently” deprived of the use of their property, but instead that 
their use was “indefinitely delayed.”287  However, even the fair market 
rental value approach has serious, insurmountable flaws. 
First, there is no actual market for rental of the right to extract 
resources that cannot be extracted.288  Who would rent the right to 
extract oil and gas that he or was prohibited from extracting?  The court 
focused too much on what the owner would want to be paid in order to 
delay development, rather than what a prospective renter would pay for 
the right to do nothing.  The better way to approach this issue would be 
to attempt to determine how much someone would pay to acquire 
speculative mineral interests in the hope of sometime being able to 
extract the minerals in the future due to changes in law, technology, or 
economics.  However, this is another way of saying that some value 
remains in the mineral estate, despite the impact of the regulation being 
challenged and, thus, no taking should be found in the first place. 
The second problem with the fair market rental value approach is that 
it is based on the admittedly problematic determination of the “pretaking 
cash value of the plaintiff’s property.”289  Although converting the 
market value to a rental value by applying market interest rates does 
reduce the taking award, it does not address the underlying difficulties in 
calculating the market value.  For instance, how are changes in the price 
of oil and gas to be accounted for?  If the prices go up, shouldn’t the 
property owner be entitled to more compensation?  If the prices go 
down, shouldn’t the government have to pay less?  Why should the 
 284. Id. at 220-21. 
 285. The court noted that “it is impossible to know whether there is oil and gas under the 
protected area without drilling wells” but found it persuasive that the plaintiffs “almost certainly would 
have discovered some oil and gas had they been allowed to drill in the protected area.”  Id. at 222.  
Whether the plaintiffs had proven they would “almost certainly” produce enough oil and gas to justify at 
$70 million award against the government was not discussed. 
 286. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).   
 287. Miller Bros., 513 N.W.2d at 222-23.  This distinction was intended to prevent either the 
public from being enriched at the expense of the property owner, or the property owner from being 
enriched at the expense of the public.  Id. at 223. 
 288. Even the Miller Bros. court recognized that “there is almost certainly no true rental market to 
look to for guidance.”  Id. at 223. 
 289. Id. at 222. 
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prices used in the determination of the value be set at one particular 
time, the time when a takings claim ultimately was decided?  This 
would open takings law to significant manipulation, and plaintiffs would 
attempt to time their fracking-takings claims with periods of high oil and 
gas prices.  However, if the court attempts to correct this by requiring 
repeated reevaluations, this would create large bureaucratic processes or 
expensive and continued court oversight.  Creating a fair system for 
ongoing determination of a fair market rental value would be, I suggest, 
unworkable and impractical. 
One final point is that fracking-takings are distinguishable from the 
closest available analogy of regulatory takings of coal by requirements 
for supporting the surface.  Leaving coal in place to support the surface 
is far more permanent than simply prohibiting fracking, which is the 
currently preferred completion method in the oil and gas industry.  
While surface uses might change or new technology might be developed 
to allow for future extraction of the coal without causing surface 
subsidence, it is much more plausible to assume that the coal must 
always remain in order to support the surface.  In stark contrast, it is 
much easier to imagine a future where developments in technology or 
our understanding of the impacts of fracking mean that restrictions on 
fracking to protect public health, safety, or welfare may be lifted.  Or 
new completion techniques might be developed that would allow the oil 
and gas at issue to be produced without fracking.  Or the price of oil and 
gas might go so high that even if relatively less amounts of oil and gas 
could be produced without fracking, production would nevertheless be 
economical.  Thus, courts should resist calls to simply analogize to the 
very different circumstances that surround regulatory takings of coal 
required to support the surface. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite common claims by many oil and gas companies, regulation 
of fracking likely would not amount to a taking except in limited 
circumstances.  Many fracking-takings claims would be defensible as 
restrictions based on background principles of law such as nuisance, 
particularly those cases where industry seeks to operate in densely 
populated areas near homes and schools.  Even if background principles 
do not preclude a taking, oil and gas companies or royalty owners would 
have a difficult time proving a total take under the parcel as a whole 
rule.  Thus, most fracking-takings would be analyzed under the Penn 
Central factors, where again, the purpose of regulations or prohibitions 
designed to prevent harm to neighbors and the public likely would 
preclude a taking.  Temporary restrictions on fracking such as moratoria 
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are even less likely to be deemed a taking under existing caselaw.  
Finally, even if a taking could be proven, the numerous issues in putting 
a value on speculative amounts of oil and gas that might be extracted in 
the future create serious policy reasons that further argue against a 
taking.  Thus, absent unusual circumstances, most courts should reject 
fracking-takings claims and allow state and local laws regarding 
fracking to remain in force without requiring potentially crippling “just 
compensation” awards, which, in effect, give governments the ability to 
respond to the public demand that public health, safety, and welfare be 
protected, even it requires the oil and gas industry not to have free reign 
to frack as it pleases.  
